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I. INTRODUCTION***
On June 3, 1974 the United States Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Brennan v. Corning Glass Works.' That deci-
sion constitutes the first analysis of the Equal Pay Act of 1963
(EPA) 2 by the Court. Coming .as it did at the tenth anniversary of
the statute's effective date, the decision represents an appropriate
* B.S. University of Massachusetts, 1939; LL.B., Boston University School of Law,
1942; Member, Federal Bar Association; Regional Solicitor, Region I, United States Depart-
ment of Labor, Boston, Mass.
** A.B, Boston College, 1963; LL.B, Boston College Law School, 1966; Member Fed-
eral Bar Association; Trial Attorney, Office of the Solicitor, Region I, United States Depart-
ment of Labor, Boston, Mass.
*** The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and are not presented as
the views of the Department of Labor or of any other government agency.
The authors wish to thank legal interns Paul D. Brenner, Paul A. Delory and Susan L.
Lennox for their invaluable assistance in the research and preparation of this article.
1 — U.S. —, 94 S. Ct.. 2223 (1974).
2
 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970).
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occasion for a review of the status of EPA enforcement. Such a
review will demonstrate that the EPA has not been, as was feared
even by its proponents, "only a promise to the ear, to be broken to
the hope, a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's
will.-"3
 To the contrary, the EPA has proven to be one of the leading
and most effective pieces of equal employment opportunity legisla-
tion in the history of the 'United States.
II. BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
At the beginning of the 20th century, women constituted only
about eighteen percent of the total labor force in the United States. 4
In the succeeding decades, this percentage increased slowly, reach-
ing just over twenty-four percent by 1940. 5 With the outbreak of
World War II, however, a rapid acceleration began in the rate of
female employment; and, by 1960 the percentage of women in the
American labor force had risen to more than thirty-two percent. 6 By
that year almost 23.3 million women were part of the labor force,
constituting 37.8 percent' of all women in the United States of
working age. 7
Although single women predominated among female workers in
1940, the upward trend in labor force participation since World War
II has been due almost entirely to the changed attitudes of married
women.s Thus, while the overall percentage of single women- in the
labor force actually fell between 1950 and 1960, the percentage of
working married women (living with their husbands) rose from 23.8
to 30.5 percent. 9
 The materially higher proportion of working wives
among families in the loW-income brackets indicates that family
need was the prime reason for the increased participation of married
women. '°
Unfortunately, these !dramatic changes in the makeup of the
3
 Margolin, Equal Pay and Equal Employment Opportunities for Women, 19 N.Y.U.
Conf. Lab. 29? (1967), quoting from Edwards v. • California, 314 U.S. 160, 186 (1941)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
4
 Economic Report of the PreSident 91, Table 21 (1973).
5 Id.
6
 Id. This participation has continued its increase to 36.7 percent in 1970 and an
estimated 37.4 percent in 1972. Id:
7
 Id. The term "working age" refers to individuals between the ages of 16 and 65. The
1970 census figures indicated that;31.56 million women were in the labor force, or 43.4
percent of all women of working age. Id.
8
 Waldman, Changes in the Libor Force Activity of Women, 93 Monthly Lab. Rev. 10,
11 (1970).
9
 Economic Report of the Pre'sident, supra note 4, at 92, Table 22.
i° In 1960, for instance, 32.4 percent of the wives worked where the husband's annual
income was less then $3,000; 35.9 percent, where the husband's income was between $3,000
and $5,000; but, only 15.9 percent, where it was $10,000 or over. Schiffman, Marital and
Family Characteristics of Workers,: March 1960, 84 Monthly Lab. Rev, 355, 363, Table 8
(1961).
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labor force were not accompanied by an enlightened change in the
occupational pattern of employment. The historic practice of sexual
segregation in jobs continued largely unabated. "Though [such]
sex-based stratification of economic roles may to some extent reflect
the socially conditioned desires of men and women themselves, there
can be little doubt that there has been considerable employer resis-
tance to the job applicant seeking employment in a position that
tradition, collective bargaining agreement, or law had marked out
as the exclusive preserve of the opposite sex."" Indeed, even where
jobs were finally opened to members of both sexes, or where limited
numbers of females entered an occupation dominated by males,
more often than not the women received considerably lower wages
than men performing the same work. The result of such dis-
criminatory practices has been the creation and perpetuation of an
actual "earnings gap." In 1960, the median earnings of full-time,
year-round women workers were only 60.8 percent of median male
earnings.I 2 Admittedly, of course, these figures do not necessarily
reflect unequal pay for equal work, as much as they might reflect
the fact that "women have restricted freedom of occupational
choice." 13
More significant, therefore, are the wage statistics for men and
women of particular occupational groups which show a similar
income disparity. For example, in 1960 the median wage for female
sales workers was only 40.9 percent of the males' earnings, and
female primary and secondary school teachers received but 75.6
percent of their male colleagues' total wages.' 4 Similar discrepancies
between the pay received by females and that received by males,
existed in numerous other occupations. For example, United States
Department of Labor surveys of the major labor market areas
showed male note tellers in banks received from $5.50 to $31 per
week more than their female counterparts.' 5 Even industrial statis-
tics indicated male machine tool operators averaging $2.05 per hour
as compared with $1.71 for women; and, male machinery assem-
Kanowitz, Sex-Based Descrimination in American Law HE Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 Hastings L.J. 305, 307 (1968).
12 Hearings on H.R. 8898 and H.R. 10226 Before the Select Subcomm. on Labor of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 66-67 (1962) [hereinafter cited
as 1962 House Hearings]; Hearing on S. 2494 and H.R. 11677 Before the Subcomm. on Labor
of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 46-47 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as 1962 Senate Hearing]. The opposition to equality for women in employ-
ment is evidently so great that the earnings gap has continued to increase. Thus, in 1970 the
median earnings for female workers were $5,323, as compared to $8,966 for males, or only
59.4 percent of median male earnings. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Fact Sheet on the Earnings Gap
(December 1971).
15 Waldman, supra note 8, at 15.
14 Economic Report of the President, supra note 4, at 104, Table 28.
15 1962 House Hearings, supra note 12, at 70; 1962 Senate Hearing, supra note 12, at 50.
3
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
biers averaging $2.07 per hour, while females earned but $1.68 per
hour." Nor can the above-mentioned differentials be justified on
the grounds that men are better educated or more experienced than
women, since "[a] large differential is also evident when the com-
parison is restricted to men and women of the same age and
education."" Thus in 1960, among individuals who had received a
bachelor's degree two years earlier, it was found that the difference
between the median annual salaries of male and female pharmacists
was $1,560, and for accountants $1,200." Indeed, the overwhelm-
ing weight of such statistics led the President's Task Force on
Women's Rights and Responsibilities to reach the startling conclu-
sion that "[s]ex bias takes a greater economic toll than racial bias." 19
During 1945 the first comprehensive federal equal pay bill was
introduced in the Congress. 2° Essentially, that bill was based upon
successful experiences under the War Labor Board, which in 1942
had issued a general order , calling for "[a]djustments which equalize
the wage or salary rates paid to females with the rates paid to males
for comparable equality and quantity of work on the same or similar
operations . . ." 21
 However, neither this nor any of the similar
measures proposed in each Congress over the following seventeen
years received favorable action, "despite the efforts of their biparti-
san proponents and [substantial] support from both the public and
the Government."22
 Indeed, it was not until the end of 1961 that a
report of a Presidential Commission generated an Administration
proposal with serious possibilities for enactment. At that time "the
President's Commission on the Status of Women, established by
President John F. Kennedy, endorsed the policy of equal pay for
comparable work." 23
During 1962 the House Committee on Education and Labor
held extensive hearings and considered a number of equal pay bills.
When the Administration proposal emerged from committee virtu-
ally unscathed, an amendment was offered and passed on the House
19 1962 House Hearings, supra note 12, at 74; 1962 Senate Hearing, supra note 12, at 53.
17
 Economic Report of the President, supra note 4, at 104.
1962 House Hearings, supra note 12, at 76; 1962 Senate Hearing, supra note 12, at 55.
19
 President's Task Force on Women's Rights and Responsibilities, A Matter of Social
Justice 18 (1970). See Murray, Economic and Educational Inequality Based on Sex: An
Overview, 5 Val. U.L. Rev. 237 (1971).
20
 S. 1178, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945). See Hearings on S. 1178 Before a Subcomm. of
the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
21
 General Order No. 16, as amended, reprinted in Wartime Wage Control and Dispute
Settlement 135 (1945) (emphasis added). See Yladek, The Equal Pay Act of 1963, 18 N. Y.U.
Conf. Lab. 381, 388-90 (1966). •
22
 Moran, Reducing Discrimination: The Role of the Equal Pay Act, 93 Monthly Lab.
Rev. 30, 31 (1970).
Simchak, Equal Pay in the United States, 103 Int'l Lab. Rev. 541 (1971). See
President's Commission on the Statiis of Women, American Women (1965).
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floor which required equal pay for equal, rather than comparable,
work. 24 That amendment served as the turning point which ulti-
mately made the enactment of an equal pay law possible. Indeed, in
the same year, the Senate also passed similar equal pay legislation.
Unfortunately, the Senate action occurred late in the session and the
two bills failed to be fully reconciled before Congress adjourned. 25
When the 88th Congress convened in 1963, the Administration
once again recommended equal pay legislation. After further
hearings, 26 bills emerged from both the Senate and the House of
Representatives. 27 The amended Senate version was enacted shortly
thereafter and sent to the President. On June 10, 1963, President
Kennedy signed the EPA and summarized the conditions which
necessitated such a law:
[T]he average woman worker earns only 60 percent of the
average wage for men . . . . Our economy today depends
upon women in the labor force. One out of three workers is
a woman. Today, there are almost 25 million women em-
ployed, and their number is rising faster than the number of
men in the labor force. It is extremely important that
adequate provision be made for reasonable levels of in-
come to them, for the care of the children . . . and for the
108 Cong. Rec, 14771 (1962). See H.R. 11677, as amended, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1962).
21 H.R. 11880, tit. II, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), enacted as a rider to a House-
approved bill on another topic. 108 Cong. Rec. 22082-85 (1962) (debates). See 109 Cong. Rec.
8914 (1963) (remarks of Senator McNamara, Mich.). '
26 See Hearings on 5. 882 and S. 910 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); Hearings on H.R. 3861
and Related Bills Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education
and Labor, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
In transmitting to Congress the Administration proposal, Secretary of Labor Willard
Wirtz stressed particularly the importance of an equal pay bill to the national economy:
The present practice of paying discriminatory wage rates on the basis of sex has an
undesirable effect on many aspects of the life of our Nation. It tends to affect
adversely the general purchasing power and the living standard of workers. It offers
an unfair competitive advantage for employers who follow this practice. The result-
ing low wage levels prevents [sic] the maximum utilization of worker skills to the
detriment of morale and, in turn, of production.
109 Cong. Rec. 2889 (1963) (statement of Secretary Wirtz). See also S. Rep. No. 176, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1963), reprinted in Staff of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., Legislative History of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 36-37. (Comm. Print
1963) [hereinafter cited as Legislative History]. The Senate Report was quoted in Corning
Glass Works v. Brennan, 94 S. Ct. 2223 (1974), where the Supreme Court stated:
Congress' purpose in enacting the Equal Pay Act was to remedy what was perceived
to be a serious and endemic problem of employment discrimination in private
industry—the fact that the wage structure of "many segments of American industry
has been based on an ancient but outmoded belief that a man, because of his role in
society, should be paid more than a woman, even though his duties are the same."
Id. at 2228.
27 S. 1409, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H.R. 6060, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
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protection of the family unit . . . . The lower the family
income, the higher the probability that the mother must
work. Today one out of five of these working mothers has
children under three. Two out of five have children of
school age. Among the remainder, about 50 percent have
husbands who earn less than $5,000 a year—many of them
much less. I believe they bear the heaviest burden of any
group in our nation. Where the mother is the sole support
of the family, she often must face the hard choice of either
accepting public assistance or taking a position at a pay
rate which averages less then two-thirds of the pay rate for
men. 28
III. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Although legislative hearings had established that women were
far more often the victims of wage discrimination, the EPA was
drafted in such a manner as to ensure that, where a woman might
be paid more than a man, the equal pay requirement would be
extended to men as well as women. The prime provision forbids
wage discrimination "between employees on the basis of sex" when
employees perform "equal Work", on jobs in the same establishment
requiring "equal skill, effort and responsibility, and which are per-
formed under similar working conditions . . ."29 "These criteria are
the same factors which traditionally have been used in accepted job
study analyses made by various manufacturing groups for industrial
and labor relation purposes." 3 ° The administrative interpretations of
the EPA3 ' have defined skill as "experience, training, education,
28
 21 Cong. Q. 978 (1963).	 •
29
 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1970) provides:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall
discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed,
between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such
establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the
opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which
requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under
similar working conditions, except. where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a
seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by
quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor
other than sex: Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage rate differential
in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of this
subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.
" Murphy, Female Wage Discrimination: A Study of the Equal Pay Act 1963-1970, 39
Cin. L, Rev. 615, 620 (1970). "These factors are the core of all job classification systems. They
form a legitimate basis for differentials in pay." 109 Cong. Rec. 9195 (1963) (remarks of
Congressman Frelinghuysen (N, L)); Legislative History, supra note 26, at 81. See also
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 94 S. Ct. at 2230.
31
 See 29 C.F.R. Part 800 (1973). 29 C.F.R. § 800.2 states, in part:
The interpretations of law contained in this part are official interpretations of
6
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and ability" as they relate to the performance of a particular job. 32
Effort is defined as "the measurement of the physical or mental
exertion needed for the performance of a job," 33 and responsibility is
measured by "the degree of accountability required in the perfor-
mance of the job, with emphasis on the importance of the job
obligation."34 The term "wages" has been interpreted to mean "all
payments made to or on behalf of the employee as remuneration for
employment," including most fringe benefits. 35
The EPA additionally contains several so-called exceptions to
the equal pay standard. Under these exceptions, where it can be
established that a differential in pay is the result of a wage payment
made pursuant to a seniority system, a merit system, a system
measuring earnings by quantity or quality of production, or that the
differential is based on any other factor other than sex, the differen-
tial is expressly excluded from the statutory proscription. 36
The EPA was enacted as an amendment to the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, as amended (FLSA), 37 which act is adminis-
tered and enforced by the United States Department of Labor. The
stated purposes of such incorporation were to eliminate "the need
for a new bureaucratic structure to enforce equal pay legislation,"
and to take advantage of the fact that "compliance should be made
easier because both industry and labor have a long-established
familiarity with existing fair labor standards provisions." 38
 Addi-
tionally, the effective date of the EPA amendments to the FLSA
the Department of Labor with respect to the application under described circum-
stances of the provisions of law which they discuss . . . . They indicate the
construction of law which the Secretary of Labor and the [Department of Labor]
believe to be correct and which will guide them in the performance of their duties
under the Act unless and until they are otherwise directed by authoritative decisions
of the courts or conclude, upon reexamination of an interpretation, that it is incor-
rect.
As the Supreme Court has pointed out, such Department of Labor interpretations "provide a
practical guide to employers and employees as to how the agency representing the public
interest in enforcement of the law will seek to apply it." Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134, 138 (1944). While not controlling upon the courts, id. at 140, such interpretations are
entitled to great weight when before the courts. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
433-34 (1971); Roland Elec. Co. v. Walling, 326 U.S. 657, 676 (1946); United States v.
American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 549 (1940).
32 29 C.F.R. § 800.125 (1973).
" 29 C.F.R. § 800.127 (1973).
34 29 C,F.R. § 800.129 (1973).
35 29 C.F.R. § 800.110 (1973).
36 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(d)(1)(1)-(iv) (1970). The exception based on "any other factor other
than sex" was the only one contained in the original Senate version, S. 1409, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1963). 109 Cong. Rec. 8866 (1963) (text of S. 1409). All the exceptions were contained,
however, in the House version, H.R. 6060, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), in which the Senate
ultimately concurred. 109 Cong. Rec. 9761-9762 (1963) (text of H.R. 6060).
37
 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970).
3" H.R. Rep. No. 309, 88th Cong,, 1st Sess. 2 (1963), reprinted in Legislative History,
supra note 26, at 43.
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was postponed until June 11, 1964, 39 which thereby granted em-
ployers a full year to comply voluntarily, and permitted the Labor
Department to establish enforcement procedures. 4°
Except as otherwise provided by specific exemptions, the FLSA
brings within the general Coverage of its wage and hour provisions
every employee who "is engaged in commerce or in the production
of goods for commerce, or ;  employed in an enterprise engaged
The
EPA ce
commer or , in the production of goods for commerce . . . "41
 neither extended nor curtailed such coverage, but simply
placed within the new equal pay requirements those employers and
employees already subject to the FLSA's minimum wage
provisions. 42 Consequently, exemptions from the minimum wage
provisions were also applied to restrict the coverage of the EPA as
well." Undoubtedly, at least some of those exemptions constitute "a
real limitation on enforcement"44
 of the apparent Congressional
purposes in enacting the EPA. 45
 Not until passage of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 46
 however, did Congress finally eliminate the
39 Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 4, 77 Stat. 56 (1963), 29 U.S.C.A. § 206, Note (1965), provides:
The amendments made by this Act shall take effect upon the expiration of one
year from the date of its enactment: Provided, That in the case of employees covered
by a bona fide collective bargaining agreement in effect at least thirty days prior to
the date of enactment of this Act, entered into by a labor organization (as defined in
section 6(d)(4) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended), the amend-
ments made by this Act shall take effect upon the termination of such collective
bargaining agreement or upon the expiration of two years from the date of enact-
ment of this Act, whichever shall first occur.
Id., reprinted in 1963 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 60.
4° See Comment, The Equal Pay Act of 1963—Problems in Upholding the Standard for
Female Employees, 5 St. Mary's L.J. 409, 411 (1973).
41 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(01) (1970). The statutory terms are defined in 29 U.S.C. §
203 (1970). The Department of Labor has issued official interpretations of the terms and
general statutory coverage thereunder, including citation of supporting court decisions. See 29
C.F.R. Part 776 (1973). See also Comment, Scope of Coverage Under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, 30 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 149 (1973).
42
 H.R. Rep. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1963), reprinted in Legislative History,
supra note 26, at 43. See 29 C.F.R. § 800.5 (1973). The minimum wage requirements of the
FLSA are contained in 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1970).
43
 "All of the fair labor standards exemptions apply: Agriculture, hotels, motels, restaur-
ants, and laundries are excluded. Also, all professional, managerial, and administrative
personnel, and outside salesmen are excluded." H:R. Rep. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 8
(1963), reprinted in Legislative History, supra note 26, at 49 (supplemental views). See 29
U.S.C. § 213(a) (1970).
44
 Murphy, supra note 30, at 619 n.25.
45 Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 2(a), 77 Stat. 56 (1963), 29 U.S.C.A. § 206, Note (1965),
reprinted in 1963 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 59.
46 Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 906(b)(1), 86 Stat. 235, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 278, 447. The Education Amendments of 1972 amended § 13(a)(1) of the FLSA, 29
U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (1970). The legislative history of the amendment indicates: "Testimony
before the [House Education and LabOr] Committee revealed that women in these [executive,
administrative, professional, or outside sales] pOsitions are too often paid less than their male
colleagues because of the existing exemption, a situation which the Committee seeks to
8
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exemption for employees engaged in bona fide executive, adminis-
trative, professional or outside sales jobs as it applied to the equal
pay requirements. 47
Any covered, non-exempt employee who believes that he or she
has been the object of equal pay discrimination may file suit against
his or her employer under section 16(b) of the FLSA. 48 Suit may be
brought despite the fact that the employee is covered by a collective
bargaining agreement which contains a binding arbitration clause,
This is so even where the employee.has previously submitted to such
arbitration and received an adverse decision. 49 Section 16(b)
specifically authorizes the recovery of back wages found to be due as
the result of a statutory violation and permits the court to award
"liquidated damages"" in a sum which may equal the amount of the
unpaid wages." Furthermore, reasonable attorney's fees and costs
are awarded if the employee is successful in such an action.
rectify." H.R. Rep. No. 554, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 84 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 2462, 2512.
47 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(a) (Supp. 1973).
48 29 U.S.C. § 216(h) (1970), as amended by the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(dXl), 88 Stat. 61 (1974), provides, in pertinent part:
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this
title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their
unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be,
and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Action to recover such
liability may be maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in any
Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for
and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated. No
employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in
writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such
action is brought. The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment
awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by
the defendant, and costs of the action.
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. 1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 615, 622.
49 Cf. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). But cf. Satterwhite v.
United Parcel Serv. Inc., — F.2d — (10th Cir. 1974). As was noted in Phillips v. Carborun-
dum Co., 361 F. Supp. 1016 (W.D.N.Y. 1973), the question whether employees "are entitled
to equal pay depends not on the contract, but on the equal pay provisions of the F.L.S.A. For
this reason, the individual employees are not required to exhaust any grievance procedures
before prosecuting an action under the F.L.S.A." Id. at 1021.
so "[Tihe liquidated damage provision is not penal in its nature but constitutes compen-
sation for the retention of a workman's pay which might result in damages too obscure and
difficult of proof for estimate other than by liquidated damages." Brooklyn Say. Bank v.
O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945); Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572,
583-84 (1942),
51 Section 11 of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1970), as amended by
Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(d)(2)(B), 88 Stat. 62 (1974), provides, in pertinent part:
In any action commenced . . . to recover unpaid minimum wages, unpaid
overtime compensation, or liquidated damages, under the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938, as amended, if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the
act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he had
reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a violation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, the court may, in its sound
9
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More often, however, equal pay violations are investigated by a
compliance officer from the Employment Standards Administration,
United States Department of Labor, either upon receipt of a specific
complaint52
 or as part of a general investigation." The compliance
officer has broad investigative authority 54 to inspect the employer's
place of business, to
 examine all .employment records 55 and to
discretion, award no liquidated damages or award any amount thereof not to exceed
the amount specified in section 216 of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. 1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 615, 623.
Any employee who is awarded liquidated damages, in addition to the back wages due, may
not recover pre-judgment interest on the back wages. Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neil, 324
U.S. at 715-16. However, if the district court makes no award of liquidated damages, the
employee is generally held to be entitled to such pre-judgment interest on the unpaid back
wages. McClanahan v. Mathews, 440 F.2d 320, 325-26 (6th Cir. 1971); Holtville Alfalfa Mills
Inc. v. Wyatt, 230 F.2d 398, 401 (9th Cir. 1955). Contra, Landaas v. Canister Co., 188 F.2d
768, 772 (3d Cir. 1951).
52
 The identity of anyone furnishing information relative to possible EPA or FLSA
violations is regarded as privileged. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Charles Martin Inspectors of
Petroleum, Inc., 459 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1972); Hodgson v. Keeler Brass Co., 56 F.R.D. 126
(W.D. Mich. 1972).
55
Total No. of Equal Pay
	 Fiscal
Investigations Conducted By	 Year
U.S. Dep't. of Labor
385 establishments 	 1969
736 establishments	 1970
1,203 establishments
	 1971
1,115 establishments
	 1972
No. of Employees	 Amounts	 Fiscal
Underpaid Under	 Found Due
	
Year
the EPA
960 $	 156,202 1965
6,633 2,097,600 1966
5,931 3,252,319 1967
6,622 2,488,405 1968
16,100 4,585,344 1969
17,719 6,119,265 1970
29,992 14,842,994 1971
29,022 14,030,889 1972
29,619 18,005,582 1973
16,507 11,043,833 6 mos. 1974
Memorandum of Morag Simchak, Chief, Branch of Equal Pay Discrimination, U.S. Dep't of
Labor (Jan. 1974).
54 29 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1970) provides, in pertinent part:
The Administrator or his designated representatives may investigate and gather
data regarding the wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of employment
in any industry subject to this chapter, and may enter and inspect such places and
such records (and make such transcriptions thereof), question such employees, and
investigate such facts, conditions, practices, or matters as he may deem necessary or
appropriate to determine whether any person has violated any provision of this
chapter, or which may aid in the enforcement of the provisions of this chapter.
55 Section 11(c) of the FLSA sets forth, inter alia, the record keeping requirements and
authorizes the administrative regulations contained in 29 C.F.R. Part 516 (1973). See 29
U.S.C. § 211(c) (1970).
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interview any employees. If a violation is discovered, the employer
will be requested to eliminate the discriminatory practice by raising
the lower wage of the aggrieved sex to the higher wage of the
opposite sex56 and by paying any back wages computed to be due."
If compliance cannot be achieved, investigative files suitable for
potential litigation will be transmitted to the appropriate regional
Office of the Solicitor, United States Department of Labor, for
further action."
The FLSA specifically permits the Secretary of Labor a two-
fold choice of litigative remedies. Once the Secretary initiates an
action against any employer, the employee's right to institute or
become a party to any private wage suit under section 16(b) is
terminated. 59 "It is important to note that this right can be termi-
nated by a government action without the employee's sanction or
consent. "60
Under section 16(c) the Secretary "may bring an action" to
recover back wages. 6 ' Until recently, however, a proviso barred the
Secretary from using that statutory authority in "any case involving
an issue of law which has not been settled finally by the courts."62
Inasmuch as this novel issue test necessarily excluded all the earlier
EPA cases because they raised questions of first impression, "the
section 16(c) remedy [became] for all practical purposes a dead
letter"63
 as regards EPA enforcement. The Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1974 not only removed the proviso, but added a
claUse permitting the recovery of an amount of liquidated damages
equal to the back wages wrongfully withheld." It may therefore be
expected that EPA suits will soon be filed under this section.
56
 The proviso to 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1970) specifically prohibits the lowering of the
higher rate in order to eliminate the wage discrimination. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1970).
57
 Voluntary compliance is obtained in more than 95 percent of the investigations.
Memorandum of Morag Simchak, supra note 53.
5H
 In the event that an investigation reveals the probability of a statutory violation, but
the case is determined to be inappropriate for litigation by the Secretary of Labor, affected
employees may be notified of their private right to sue for relief under section 16(b) of the
FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970). With regard to the duties and responsibilities of the
Office of the Solicitor, see U.S. Dep't of Labor, Annual Report 1972, 60, 69-70 (1973).
59 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), (c) (1970).
ha
 Comment, Monetary Recovery Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 45 Texas L.
Rev. 921, 922 (1967).
HL
 29 U,S.C. § 216(c) (1970), as amended by the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259 § 26, 88 Stat. 73 (1974), provides, in pertinent part: "The Secretary
may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover the amount of the
unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation and an equal amount as liquidated
damages." 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (Supp. 1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S, Code Cong. & Ad. News
615, 637.
62 29 U,S.C. § 216(c) (1970).
H3 Hodgson v. Wheaton Glass Co., 446 F.2d 527, 532 (3d Cir. 1971).
" Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 26, 83 Stat. 73 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 615, 637.
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
The second litigative remedy available to the Secretary, which
was the only type of EPA action brought by the Secretary of Labor
throughout the first decade of enforcement, is that instituted pur-
suant to section 17 of the FLSA. 65 The essential reason, of course,
that suits were brought exclusively under section 17 is the absence of
the novel issue limitation in that section. 66 This remedy authorizes
the Secretary to sue in a United States district court for an in-
junction restraining further violations of the FLSA, including "the
restraint of any withholding of payment of minimum wages or
overtime compensation found by the court to be due to em-
ployees . . . ."67
 Moreover, such injunctive actions may be brought
in cases of discriminatory harassment or discharge. 68 Such suits may
seek reinstatement of an employee and reimbursement of wages lost
as the result of a discharge for reasons related to the provisions of
the FLSA. 69
 Inasmuch as any section 17 action is equitable in
nature, there is no right to a jury trial."
Should an employer fail to comply with any injunction granted
in a section 17 action, the Secretary of Labor may also bring a civil
65 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1970) provides, in pertinent part:
The district courts . . . shall have jurisdiction, for cause shown, to restrain
violations of section 215 of this title, including in the case of violations of section
2 15(a)(2) of this title the restraint of any withholding of payment of minimum wages
or overtime compensation found by the court to be due to employees under this
chapter . . .
Section 15(0(2) of the FLSA makes it unlawful for any person "to violate any of the provisions
of section 206 or section 207 . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(2) (1970).
66 Hodgson v. Wheaton Glass Co., 446 F.2d 527, 534 (3d Cir. 1971); Hodgson v.
American Can Co., 440 F.2d 916, 921 (8th Cir. 1971).
67
 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1970). 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(3) (1970) provides: "For purposes of
administration and enforcement, any amounts owing to any employee which have been
withheld in violation of [the equal pay provisions] shall be deemed to be unpaid minimum
wages or unpaid overtime compensation under [the FLSA]."
6° 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1970), provides that it shall be unlawful for any person:
to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such
employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any
proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in
any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee.
69 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960), where the
Court upheld the award of lost wages as part of the trial court's general equity power to insure
compliance with the FLSA. Id. at 291-92. See also Note, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 939 (1960).
7° Sullivan v. Wirtz, 359 F.2d 426 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 852
(1966); Wirtz v. Jones, 340 F.2d 901, 904-05 (5th Cir. 1965); Comment, The Fair Labor
Standards Act and Trial By Jury, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 514 (1965).
Prejudgment interest is awarded on the amount of back wages found by the court to have
been withheld. Hodgson v. Wheaton Glass Co., 446 F.2d 527, 535 (3d Cir. 1971); Hodgson v.
American Can Co., 440 F.2d 921, 922 (8th Cir. 1971). The interest is paid on such amounts
withheld at the rate of 6 percent from the median date of the violation period in question.
Hodgson v. Corning Glass Works, 330 F. Supp. 46, 51 (W.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd as modified,
with specific approval of the interest award, 474 F.2d 226, 236 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd sub nom.,
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 94 S. Ct. 2223 (1974).
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contempt proceeding:n If found in contempt, the employer may be
ordered to pay not only the amount of the wrongfully withheld
compensation, but court costs and the Government's expenses in
investigating and prosecuting the matter as wel1. 72
Generally, any suit under the EPA to enforce the wage liability
of an employer must be commenced within two years after the cause
of action accrued. 73 A separate cause of action for unpaid wages
accrues on each regular payday on which less wages are paid than
are required under the EPA. 74
 Thus, the statute of limitations bars
recovery of only the portion of back wages owed that was not paid
prior to the two-year period immediately preceding the commence-
ment of the action. While the courts must consequently restrict
recoveries to the period allowed, they may look "as far back as
necessary to determine whether the present wage discrimination
occurring within the limitation [period] . . . is the result of past
discriminatory conduct . . . ." 75
By the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, moreover,
the statute of limitations was expanded to permit a three-year recov-
ery period for causes of action arising out of a willful violation. 76 In
Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, Inc.," the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held:
[a] violation of [the] FLSA is 'wilful' when . . . there is
substantial evidence in the record to support a finding that
the employer knew or suspected that his actions might
violate the FLSA. Stated most simply, we think the test
should be: Did the employer know the FLSA was in the
picturer 8
Of course, this standard applies to EPA actions as well. 79 Where the
violations are of a willful nature, the Department of Labor may
' I See, e.g., McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187 (1949); Mitchell v. Fiore,
470 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 9.38 (1973).
72 Wirtz v. Chase, 400 F.2d 665, 667 (6th Cir. 1968); Fleming v. Credit Serv., Inc., 16
BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 755, 761, 51 CCH Lab. Cas. 11 31,658 (S.D. Fla. 1964), aff'd, 372
F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1967).
73 Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, § 6(a), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (1970).
74 See 29 C.F.R. § 790.21(b) (1973).
75 Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law III: Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 Hastings L.]. 305, 352 (1968). See Hodgson v.
Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041, 1050 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1973).
7(,
	
L. No. 89-601, § 601(b), 80 Stat. 844 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 978, 994.
77 458 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972).
458 F.2d at 1142.
79 Brennan v. J.M. Fields, Inc., 488 F.2d 443, 448 (5th Cir. 1973), petition for cert.
filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3511 (U.S. March 5, 1974).
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recommend to the Department of Justice that a criminal action be
brought against the employer under section 16(a) of the FLSA. That
provision carries a maximum $10,000 fine and imprisonment for
second offenders.g° This offense is subject to a five-year statute of
In addition to the more traditional FLSA actions against an
employer, the EPA also authorizes enforcement against labor or-
ganizations which "cause or attempt to cause . . . an employer to
discriminate against an employee" in violation of the equal pay
standard. 82
 Interpreting this provision, the Department of Labor
has determined that such a labor organization (or its agents) must
therefore "refrain from strike or picketing activities aimed at in-
ducing an employer to institute or maintain a prohibited wage
differential, and must not demand any terms or any interpretation
of terms in a collective bargaining agreement with such an employer
which would require the latter to discriminate in the payment of
wages . . . ."83
With regard to workers covered by collective bargaining
agreements, it is further the position of the Department of Labor
that unions "share with the employer the responsibility for ensuring
that the wage rates required by such agreements" are not violative
8° 29 U.S.C. § 216(a) (1970), provides:
Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of section 215 of this
title shall upon conviction thereof be subject to a fine of not more than $10,000, or to
imprisonment for not more than six months, or both. No person shall be imprisoned
under this subsection except for an offense committed after the conviction of such
person for a prior offense under this subsection.
81 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1970). See, e.g., United States v. Klinghoffer Bros. Realty Corp.,
285 F.2d 487 (2d Cir, 1960).
82
 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(2) (1970) provides:
No labor organization, or its agents, representing.employees of an employer
having employees subject to any provision of this section shall cause or attempt to
cause such an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of para-
graph (1) of this subsection.
The original Senate version, S. 1409, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), did not contain any
provisions relative to labor organizations. 109 Cong. Rec. 8866 (1963) (text of S. 1409). 29
U.S.C. § 206(d)(4) (1970) provides:
As used in this subsection, the term "labor organization" means any organiza-
tion of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in
which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of
dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay,
hours of employment, or conditions of work.
This is the same definition of "labor organization" that is used in the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1970).
The statute of limitations applicable to actions brought against labor organizations is the
same as that for actions brought against employers. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (1970). In such
situations, however, the cause of action accrues when the union actually causes the employer
to discriminate in violation of the EPA. Hodgson v. Sagner, Inc., 20 BNA Wage & Hour Cas.
49, 66 CCH Lab. Cas• II 32,544 (D. Md. 1971).
ILI 29 C.F.R. § 800.106 (1973).
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of the equal pay standard." This interpretation derives substantial
support from the legislative history of the EPA. 85 Nonetheless, in a
decision directly on point it was held that, "[o]n its face, the statute
requires some sort of affirmative action by the union involved" and
that the mere signing of a collective bargaining agreement, without
more, does not constitute a violation. 86
The Department of Labor has, in any event, adopted the en-
forcement position that, whether or not a union is in part responsi-
ble for the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement which
sets a discriminatory wage schedule, only the employer is liable for
the resulting back wage claims. Thus, the Department has taken the
position that an employer may not seek contribution or
indemnification by filing a third party complaint against the em-
ployees' collective bargaining representative. 87
" Id.
85 Note the following colloquy between Congressmen Goodell (N.Y.) and O'Hara
(Mich.):
Mr. GOODELL .	 . It is my view, and I think it is . . . the view of our
subcommittee that this bill as now written obligates the union and gives the union
the responsibility to negotiate [where an existing agreement violates the EPA] to
eliminate the discrimination ... .
Mr. O'HARA . . . It is my understanding, as it is the understanding of the
gentleman from New York that if a labor organization is in any way at fault in
maintaining such a discriminatory wage rate, they would be subject to all the
penalties and all the enforcement provisions provided under the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act.
Mr. GOODELL. I would stress the word "maintaining" in your reply, because we
feel that the words "shall cause or attempt to cause" put an obligation on a labor
union, as well as the employer, to change that existing agreement, if the agreement is
in violation of this act and this requires tbe employer to violate the act. Does the
gentleman agree?
Mr. O'HARA .. I would agree. Not only does it refer to new agreements but to an
existing agreement where a labor organization would attempt to maintain a dis-
criminatory pattern in an old agreement and resist efforts to change to the pattern
required by this act.
109 Cong. Rec. 9209 (1963) (remarks of Congressmen Goodell and O'Hara). See also Staff of
the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Legislative History of the
Equal Pay Act of 1963, 93-94 (Comm. Print 1963).
88 Murphy v. Miller Brewing Co., 307 F. Supp. 829, 839 (E.D. Wis. 1969), aff'd sub
nom. Hodgson v. Miller Brewing Co., 457 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1972). See also Shultz v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp,, 315 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Tenn. 1970) (petition for injunctive relief
against employer and unions denied on the merits).
87
 Wirtz v. Hayes Indus., Inc,, 18 BNA Wage & Hour Cas, 590, 58 CCH Lab. Cas.
32,085 (N.D. Ohio 1968). The importance of the contribution issue to employers can easily
be seen from the fact that the Hayes Industries case resulted in the employer paying $206,214
in back wages, including interest. See Memorandum of Morag Simchak, supra note 53.
In some cases, however, an employer has been permitted to join a labor organization for
the purpose of establishing their respective rights, in relation to the collective bargaining
agreement, as the result of the EPA action. See Hodgson v. School Bd., 56 F.R.D. 393, 395
(W.D. Pa. 1972); Johnson v. Thomson Brush Moore, Inc., 21 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 715,
719, 74 CCH Lab. Cas. 11 33,124 (N.D. Ohio 1974). But see Phillips v. Carborundum Co.,
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Were the Court to authorize or sanction the
employer's shifting of his financial responsibility to a labor.
organization it could be thwarting one of the pre-eminent
policies of the Act that the employer be primarily liable for
the payment of equal wages to employees. By the same
token Congress deemed it essential that for effective en-
forcement of the Act any economic and competitive advan-
tages accruing to the employer due to his non-compliance
with the equal pay provisions be extinguished and the
pecuniary benefits disgorged."
Consequently during the first ten years of EPA enforcement,
out of more than 600 actions filed by the Department of Labor, 89
only one suit was brought against a labor union seeking a monetary
recovery; but, in that case the labor organization had taken a
discriminatory action apart from entering into a collective bargain-
ing agreement. In Hodgson v. Sagner, Inc., 90 it was mutually
agreed after a series of labor-management meetings that the EPA
had been violated. Accordingly, the employer proposed to raise the
aggrieved women to the male rate and pay full restitution. Instead
of accepting this offer, which would have remedied the violations,
the union insisted on a plan whereby the women were paid only one
quarter of the amount owed as back wages and the remainder was
paid to more than one hundred other employees as a temporary
"wage increase." Based on those facts, the district court found the
employer and the union liable jointly and severally as to the entire
amount of back wages remaining unpaid to the aggrieved female
workers. 91
 On appeal the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision on
the ground that the district court "was within its general equitable
powers in imposing such liability upon the Union." 92
' While it is thus evident that a labor organization may be
required to pay back wages in an injunction proceeding instituted
by the Secretary of Labor, the same does not appear to be true
where an aggrieved worker brings a private suit seeking the identi-
cal back wages. For as one district court has held, the FLSA
361 F. Supp. 1016, 1019-20 (W.D.N.Y. 1973); Hodgson v. Board of Educ., 344 F. Supp. 79,
86 (D.N.J.), appeal dismissed, 468 F.2d 1325 (3d Cir. 1972).
8° Love v. Temple Univ., 366 F. Supp. 835 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (summarizing and concur-
ring in the Department's position as stated in its brief amicus curiae).
89 Memorandum of Morag Simchak, supra note 53.
9U 326 F. Supp. 371 (D. Md. 1971), aff'd sub nom., Hodgson v. Baltimore Regional
Joint Bd., Amal. Clothing Workers, 462 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). See Note, 31
Md. L. Rev. 365 (1971); Note, 6 Suffolk L. Rev. 733 (1972).
9' 326 F. Supp. at 377. It is the position of the Department of Labor that a labor
organization is also liable to criminal penalties under 29 U.S.C. § 216(a) (1970), although no
EPA criminal prosecutions have yet been undertaken, 29 C.F.R. § 800.166(d) (1973).
92
 462 F.2d at 181.
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provision "which allows maintenance of a civil action by employees
for monetary damages, provides for such liability only on the part of
`any employer.' It does not provide for private actions by employees
against a union."93 It is therefore apparent that, at least under the
EPA, neither an employer nor an employee may seek a monetary
award from a labor organization.
Further, it is well-settled that a labor organization lacks stand-
ing to enforce the equal pay rights of its members in a private EPA
action." Similarly, a labor organization may not intervene where
the Secretary of Labor has already instituted an action against an
employer, and the union representing that employer's employees
objects to an agreement reached in settlement of the suit. For
example, the Department of Labor and two other federal agencies
brought suit in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.
American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 95 to end discriminatory
employment practices based on sex. The Consent Decree entered in
settlement of that suit called for the payment of $15 million in back
wages,96 of which approximately $7.7 million covered EPA
violations. 97 One of the unions representing affected employees,
however, was dissatisfied with the arrangements for monetary
awards and future compliance. The union's petition to intervene
and to deny enforcement of the Consent Decree was rejected by the
court, except for the permission granted to the union to intervene on
the limited issue of the rights of pregnant employees."
IV. RELATIONSHIP TO TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF
1964
Closely related to, but more far reaching than the EPA are the
sex discrimination prohibitions contained in Title VII of the Civil
93 Tuma v. American Can Co., 367 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (D.N.J. 1973).
94 Section 5 of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, § 5, 61 Stat. 84, amended section 16(b) of
the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 216(b) (1970), to prohibit representative actions. That the amendment
was in good part directed at unions can be seen from H.R. Rep. No. 71, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1029.
" 365 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D. Pa. 1973).The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
brought suit to enforce Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e et seq. (Supp. II 1972), while the Department of Justice brought suit on behalf of the
Office of the Federal Contract Compliance to enforce Executive Order 11246, as amended, 3
C.F.R. § 173 (1973).
96 365 F. Supp. at 1109.
" Memorandum of Morag Simchak, supra' note 53. In similar suits, recoveries of back
wages have been made from the Pacific Telephbne and Telegraph Company ($593,457) and
the New England Telephone and Telegraph Company ($457,000). Id. See Kilberg, Progress
and Problems in Equal Employment Opportunity, 24 Lab. L.J. 651, 653 (1973). It is quite
interesting to note that the American Telephone and Telegraph Company subsequently agreed
to pay another $7 million in back wages to management employees who had not been covered
by the EPA at the time of the original suit.
" 365 F. Supp. at 1119-23, 1128-29.
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Rights Act of 1964. 99
 The prime provision of Title VII makes it an
unlawful employment practice for a covered employer to fail or
refuse to hire, or to discharge any individual, or "otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."'°°
The essential difference, therefore, between the EPA and the sex
discrimination provisions of Title VII is that Title VII applies to all
conditions of employment, while the EPA prohibits sex discrimina-
tion only in the area of compensation.'°'
To aid in the administration of Title VII, Congress created the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 1 ° 2 Although
the original version of Title VII did not contain any such specific
requirement, the courts held that an individual must initiate his
charge of discrimination with the EEOC in order to bring a com-
plaint before the courts.'° 3
 Under that original version, however,
there was "no enforcement function for the EEOC other than any
voluntary compliance that it could induce."'" Thus, during the past
decade, under the EPA
the courts have had considerably greater opportunity to
reveal their response to sex discrimination than has been
99
 As amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Supp. H 1972). See Edwards, Sex Discrimina-
tion Under Title VII; Some Unresolved Issues, 24 Lab. L.J. 411 (1973); Wilcox, Sex Discrimi-
nation Provisions of Title VII: A Maturing Controversy, 3 Pac. L.J. 37 (1972).
1 " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (Supp. II 1972) (emphasis added). The same section further
makes it an unlawful employment practice to classify employees, or applicants for employ-
ment, in any manner which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of "employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee" for any of the above
causes, including sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1970). Similar provisions make sex discrimi-
nation unlawful practices whether committed by employment agencies or labor organizations.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(b), (c) (1970).
'°' Sangerman, A Look at the Equal Pay Act in Practice, 22 Lab. L.J. 259, 260 (1971).
On the similarity of employer defenses under Title VII, see Ragsdale, Defenses to Sex
Discrimination Suits, 5 Urban Lawyer 359 (1973). Because of the overlap between EPA and
Title VII remedies, a private plaintiff will often couple the two statutes in a single action,
with the hope of gaining the best advantages of both. See, e.g., Cupples v. Transport. Ins.
Co., 371 F. Supp. 146, 148 (N.D. Tex. 1974); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 366 F.
Supp. 763, 789 (D.D.C. 1973).
1 ° 2
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1970).
103 See, e.g., Stebbins v. Continental Ins. Co., 442 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Beverly v.
Lone Star Lead Constr. Co., 437 F.2d 1 136  (5th Cir. 1971); Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line
R.R., 405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968).
During the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1972, the EEOC received 1,301 charges concern-
ing sex discrimination with regard to compensation (1,252 from females, 49 from males), out
of a total of 9,056 sex-related discrimination charges made against employers. EEOC, 7th
Annual Report 39 (1973).
104 Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, 40 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 824,879 (1972). "What frequently resulted under this scheme
was a purely mechanical function of filing the charge and receiving from the Commission a
notice of right to sue." Id. at 879 n.355.
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the case under Title VII. This is, of course, because from
the start of the Equal Pay Act, the Secretary of Labor has
had authority to seek court enforcement, including, ex-
plicitly, restitution of back pay.'° 5
This situation was altered by the passage of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972. 106 That act amended Title VII,
but retained the general scheme of the prior law, requiring the
EEOC initially to process a charge of employment discrimination
through investigation and conciliation,' 07 and permitting aggrieved
individuals to file suit.'" As amended, Title VII also
now authorizes the EEOC, in cases involving discrimina-
tory practices in the private sector, to bring a civil action
against' a respondent when it is unable to conciliate. Au-
thority to bring civil actions against state and local gov-
ernments is vested in the Attorney General.'"
These amendments will, of course, inevitably increase the volume of
sex discrimination litigation under Title VII.
In both Title VII and the EPA, "Congress has itself manifested
an increasing sensitivity to sex-based classifications""° and a "pur-
pose to eliminate subjective assumptions and traditional stereotyped
conception"I" regarding the equal employment of members of both
sexes in the same job. Thus, "bit is apparent that the purposes of
[Title VII] and the Equal Pay Act are interrelated, and that the two
. . . must in some way be `harmonized.' " 112 For, "[a]lthough the
Civil Rights Act is much broader than the Equal Pay Act, its
provisions regarding discrimination based on sex are in pari materia
with the Equal Pay Act."" 3 This is clearly recognized in Title VII.
Section 703(h) states that an employer's differentiation upon the
basis of sex in determining wages or compensation shall not be an
unlawful employment practice under Title VII if the differentiation
is authorized by the EPA." 4
"5 Margolin, Management-Union Confrontation 1972 New Frontiers: Who Discrimi-
nates Against Women, 25 N.Y.U. Conf. Lab. 205, 220 (1972). See Davidson, "Back Pay"
Awards Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 26 Rutgers L. Rev. 741 (1973).
106
 Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 122.
107 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. 11 1972).
"8 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. II 1972).
'°9 Sape & Hart, supra note 104, at '862.
115
 Frontiero v, Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687 (1973).
111 Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971) (Title VII),
citing Shultz v. First Victoria Nat'l Bank, 420 F.2d 648, 656 (5th Cir. 1969) (EPA).
112 Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 727 (5th Cir. 1970).
II3
 Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 266 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905
(1970).
114
 42 U.S,C, § 2000e-2(h) (Supp. II 1972). The EEOC guidelines on sex discrimination
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Thus, in one Title VII action, Hays v. Potlach Forests, Inc.,I 15
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit looked to the EPA in
holding that "any discrimination against men resulting from the
Arkansas [protective] statute [requiring women to be paid time and
one-half for all hours worked in excess of eight hours per day] is to
be cured by extending the benefits of that statute to male employees
. . ." 16
 Likewise, the Tenth Circuit in Ammons v. Zia Co. 17
looked to cases decided under the EPA in determining the shifting
burdens of proof in a Title VII sex discrimination action.'"
The courts have been far less unanimous, however, in deter-
mining to what extent the prohibitions of Title VII apply in an EPA
action. In Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., " 9 the Third Circuit sug-
gested in dictum that equal pay would be required for a "male" job
and a "female" job even though the two may be unequal, if the
women are prohibited from performing the "male" job. 12° In con-
trast, however, the Fifth Circuit in Hodgson v. Golden Isles Conva-
lescent Home, Inc. 121
 held that questions concerning unequal jobs
"are to be resolved in actions under Title VII . . . Courts must be
cautious not to apply improperly one Congressional act to achieve a
purpose for which another act was intended."' 22 Accordingly, the
Fifth Circuit takes the position that if the "male" work as compared
to the "female" work is unequal, it is beyond the purview of the
EPA but may still be within the domain of Title VII. Nonetheless,
there has been no definitive resolution of this issue and it is yet quite
alive.
V. ENFORCEMENT
The plaintiff in an equal pay case, whether an employee or the
Secretary of Labor, has the burden of proving that the aggrieved
employee has performed work equal to that performed by employees
of the opposite sex involving equal skill, effort, and responsibility,
and that the work was performed under similar working conditions
in the same establishment. 123 The plaintiff must, therefore, produce
provide that, "[w]here such a defense is raised the Commission will give appropriate consider-
ation to the [EPA] interpretations of the . Department of Labor, but will not be bound
thereby." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.8 (1973).
115
 465 F.2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1972).
116
 Id. at 1083. The court cited the proviso to 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1970). But see
Homemakers, Inc. v. Division of Indus. Welfare, 356 F. Supp. 1111 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
"/ 448 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1971).
118
 Id. at 119.
119 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
120
 421 F.2d at 266..
121
 468 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
' 22
 Id. at 1258-59. See also Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 727 (5th
Cir. 1970).
123 Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 94 S. Ct, at 2228.
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evidence sufficient to permit an accurate comparison of job content
and duties between the two sexes. Should the plaintiff fail to prove
any one of the criteria, "the equal pay standard cannot apply even
though the jobs may be equal in all other respects." 124
[T]he complaint must be dismissed even if the wage differ-
entials were unreasonably large in comparison with the
actual differences in skill, effort, responsibility, or working
conditions, and were based on discriminatory motivation;
Congress did not intend to put either the Secretary or the
courts in the business of evaluating jobs and determining
what constituted a proper differential for unequal work. 125
There is, of course, no violation at all unless a wage differential
exists between the two sexes for the equal work in question. Proof of
that wage differential is also part of the plaintiff's burden in an EPA
case.
Once a plaintiff has established that a wage differential exists
between male and female employees performing equal work, the
question arises as to whether the plaintiff must also show that the
differentiation is based on sex. The Fifth Circuit in Hodgson v.
American Bank of Commerce, 126 faced with exactly this question,
held that the plaintiff "has no such burden to convince the court." 127
On the other hand, however, in the Corning Glass Works case, 128
the Second Circuit concluded that a plaintiff must establish a prima
facie case that the wage differential represents discrimination on the
basis of sex. 129 This holding was based on a reading of Shultz v.
Wheaton Glass Co., 13 ° in which the Third Circuit determined that
"the Secretary clearly established his prima facie case that the wage
differential was based on sex and therefore discriminated against
women," but noted that the burden was met solely by showing the
existence of a wage differential between male and female employees
for equal work. 13 ' Consequently, it would not appear that the
plaintiff must meet the additional burden of proving specifically that
sex is the motivation for the wage differential. For as the Supreme
Court noted, in affirming the Second Circuit's Corning Glass deci-
124
 29 C.F.R. §§ 800.125, 800.127 (1973).
125 Hodgson v. Corning Glass Works, 474 F.2d 226, 231 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd sub nom.
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 94 S. Ct. 2223 (1974),
116
 447 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1971),
127 Id. at 420.
128 Hodgson v, Corning Glass Works, 474 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1973).
129 Id. at 231.
13° 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970).
" 1
 Id. at 266.
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sion, "the Secretary must show that an employer pays different
wages to employees of opposite sexes" for equal work. 132
In any event, once a plaintiff has established the required
prima facie case, "the burden shifts to the employer to show that the
differential is justified under one of the [EPA's] exceptions." 133 The
employer must prove as an affirmative defense that the wage differ-
ential was not in any manner based on sex, but rather that it was
based on a non-discriminatory seniority system, a merit system, a
system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of produc-
tion, or some other factor other than sex. 134 Application of such
exceptions to the equal pay standard are to be narrowly construed
against an employer seeking to assert them.' 35
The equal pay standard is statutorily restricted on an "estab-
lishment" basis. While the word "establishment" is not expressly
defined in either the EPA or the FLSA, the Supreme Court noted in
one FLSA case that the term refers to "a distinct physical place of
business" rather than to "an entire business or enterprise." 136
 The
Department of Labor has therefore ordinarily considered each phys-
ically separate place of business as a single establishment. 137 In this
connection, for instance, a unit store in a chain store system will
constitute the establishment, but not the individual departments
within the store.' 38
 There are, however, a number of exceptions to
the rule. Thus, a college campus' 39 or an entire school district'"
may be a single establishment for purposes of equal pay comparison.
Geographically proximate industrial plants may also be a single
132 Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 94 S. Ct. 2228.
133 Id. at 2229.
134
 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(d)(1)(i)-(iv) (1970).
135 See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 94 S. Ct. at 2229 n.12, and Shultz v. First
Victoria Nat'l Bank, 420 F.2d 648, 654 n.8 (5th Cir. 1969), Both cases cite, inter alia, A. H.
Phillips, Inc. v, Walling, 324 U.S. 490 (1945) and Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S.
388 (1960), which held that exemptions under the FLSA "are to be narrowly construed against
the employers seeking to assert them and their application limited to those ... plainly and
unmistakably within their terms and spirit," Arnold, supra, at 392; A. H. Phillips, supra, at
493. While the EPA "provides an exception rather than an exemption [there is] no essential
difference between the two insofar as the law relating to burden of proof is concerned."
Foremost Dairies, Inc. v, Wirtz 381 F.2d 653, 656 n.4 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
946 (1968) (emphasis added).
131' A. H. Phillips, 324 U.S. at 496. See also Mitchell v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 352
U.S. 1027 (1957) (per curiam).
137
 29 C.F.R. § 800.108 (1973).
'36
	 29 C.F.R. § 779.304 (1973). This standard was found to "correctly interpret the
Act." Hodgson v. City Stores, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 942, 946 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd sub nom.
Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1973).
' 39 Hodgson v. Waynesburg College, 20 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 142, 145, 66 CCH
Lab. Cas. ¶ 32,542 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
140 Cf. Brennan v. Board of Educ., — BNA Wage & Hour Cas.
	 — CCH Lab. Cas.
¶— (D.N.J. 1974).
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establishment. 141
 In each case the relevant questions concern physi-
cal location, identity of business purpose, integration of services,
centralization of administration and management, interchange of
employees, and coverage under a single collective bargaining
agreement.
While it is thus no major problem to define the basic limits of
the term "establishment," the same is not true for the other essential
terms of the EPA: "equal skill," "equal effort," "equal responsibil-
ity," "similar working conditions," "any other factor other than
sex," etc. Indeed, as the Department of Labor has readily admitted,
many of the terms "cannot be precisely defined."'" The application
of the equal pay standard is necessarily a matter of case-by-case
analysis,'" not readily subject to broad generalization. There is
significant value to be derived, therefore, from an examination of
the actual judicial construction and application of those terms dur-
ing the first decade of EPA enforcement.
In undertaking such an examination, it must be remembered
that the EPA "is broadly remedial, and it should be construed and
applied so as to fulfill the underlying purposes which Congress
sought to achieve. ,,144 "The Act was intended as a broad charter of
women's rights in the economic field. It sought to overcome the
age-old belief in women's inferiority and to eliminate the depressing
effects on living standards of reduced wages for female workers and
the economic and social consequences which flow from it."'" The
EPA is thus "in the category of statutes which must be construed
broadly so as to advance their important purposes." 146 As the Su-
preme Court noted, in language directly applicable to the EPA:
[T]hese provisions, like the other portions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, are remedial and humanitarian in
purpose. We are not here dealing with mere chattels or
articles of trade but with the rights of those who toil, of
those who sacrifice a full measure of their freedom and
talents to the use and profit of others. Those are the rights
that Congress has specially legislated to protect. Such a
'''' Shultz v. Corning Glass Works, 319 F. Supp. 1161, 1163-64 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd
sub nom. Hodgson v. Corning Glass Works, 474 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd sub nom.
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 94 S. Ct. 2223 (1974).
' 42 29 C.F.R. § 800.122(a) (1973).
145 Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 470 F.2d 729, 730 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
144 Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 94 S. Ct. at 2234.
145 Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905
(1970), quoted in Hodgson v. Security Nall Bank, 460 F.2d 57, 63 (8th Cir. 1972).
146 Berger, Equal Pay, Equal Employment Opportunity and Equal Enforcement of the
Law for Women, 5 Val. U.L. Rev. 326, 328 (1971).
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statute must not be interpreted or applied in a narrow,
grudging manner. 147
VI. THE Wheaton Glass DECISION
After six years of difficult, arduous and indecisive litigation, the
Labor Department's program of enforcement of the EPA came of
age in Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co. 148 Prior to the Third Circuit's
decision in that case, survey of the fifteen equal pay cases tried on
the district court level by the Department of Labor indicates that
only four cases were won, while eleven were lost.'" Inasmuch as
Wheaton Glass was a true landmark case, establishing principles
which have been the very heart of subsequent enforcement ac-
tivities, it is worthy of close examination, both as an example of
equal pay litigation and as a guide to equal pay law.
The Wheaton Glass Company is one of the largest manufactur-
ers of special-order glass containers in the United States, having its
principal plants in Millville/Vineland, New Jersey. 15° Prior to 1956
the Bottle Inspection Department, like almost all production de-
partments at Wheaton, was staffed solely with male employees who
were classified as "selector-packers" and "snap-up boys." At that
time, because of a shortage of available men in the local labor
market, Wheaton was forced to hire women as selector-packers for
the inspection department. Accordingly, a special provision was
added to the collective bargaining agreement, whereby no male
selector-packer was to be replaced by a. female except to fill a
vacancy resulting from resignation, retirement, or dismissal for just
cause. On the insistence of the union separate "male" and "female"
selector-packer job classifications were also created, with certain job
147
 Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. v. Muscoda Local 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944)
(emphasis added).
1411
 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970). See Murphy, Female
Wage Discrimination: A Study of the Equal Pay Act 1963-1970, 39 Cin. L. Rev. 615, 616
(1970). Although Wheaton Glass was the first equal pay case to reach the appellate level, the
Third Circuit's presentation of specific questions for additional briefing and its order for
reargument resulted in the final decision being handed down somewhat more than a month
after Shultz v. First Victoria Nat'l Bank, 420 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1969).
149 Murphy, supra note 148, at 623 n.47. In that same period, however, approximately
$12.6 million in back wages was collected and distributed to some 36,000 women (and a few
men) as a result of voluntary compliance agreements and consent judgments. See Hearings on
S. Joint Res. 61 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 770 (1970).
As an aside it is interesting to note that, while some men have recovered back wages as
the result of the equal pay requirement, only one private EPA action brought on behalf of
men has been located. Interestingly, in De Figueiredo v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 55
F.R.D. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), the court humorously commented that "jtjhe forces of women's
liberation confront their male counterparts in this litigation." Id. at 45.
15 ° Facts abstracted from Wirtz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 284 F. Supp. 23 (D.N.J. 1968).
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content differences and a wage differential in favor of the males of
approximately 10 percent.
The principal function of both the male and female selector-
packers, and the bulk of their working time (estimated to be an
average of 98 percent for women and 82 percent for men as a class)
consisted of the performance of identical selecting and packing
operations. As glass emerged from cooling ovens on a conveyor belt,
the selector-packers discarded defective items into waste containers
and packed the remaining items into cardboard cartons. To the
extent that differences did exist between the "male" and "female"
jobs, the divergence resulted solely from the assignment of many
(but not all) of the men to perform miscellaneous unskilled manual
tasks ordinarily performed by the so-called snap-up boys. The extra
tasks typically involved crating and moving glassware, sweeping
and other general cleaning chores. Such assignments consumed vary-
ing amounts of any given male selector-packer's total working
time."'
After enactment of the EPA, Wheaton Glass was one of the
first large manufacturing companies to be investigated by the De-
partment of Labor. The investigation resulted in a finding that the
male and female workers were performing equal work for unequal
pay. 152 When faced with this finding, which was accompanied by a
request to equalize the wage rates in question and pay back wages
to the women, Wheaton balked. In January 1966, after almost a
year of fruitless compliance negotiations, an injunctive action was
instituted in the name of the Secretary of Labor.' 53
When the case was brought to trial in 1968, 154 Wheaton argued
151 Congressman Peter Frelinghuysen of New Jersey had hypothesized a similar situation
in the House debates which immediately preceded the passage of the EPA:
For example, a plant may have one rate for a classification such as a male selector
and packager and another for the classification female selector and packager. Yet
both are doing the same job on the same assembly line. Such discrimination would
be a violation . . . On the other hand, the male packagers may be required to lift
the heavy crates off the assembly line and place them on dollies or do various jobs
requiring additional physical effort. The women selectors may work on the assembly
line, selecting small items, for example, and placing them in crates. This would he a
significant difference which would justify a difference in pay.
109 Cong. Rec. 9196 (1963) (remarks of Representative Frelinghuysen); Staff of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Legislative History of the Equal Pay
Act of 1963, 10-11 (Comm. Print 1963),
152 Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 319 F. Supp, at 233. The court noted that there had
been, as well, "considerable doubt in Wheaton's mind as to whether its (selector—packer] job
classifications and wage rates were in compliance with the Act .. , ." Id.
153 Id. at 230, 233.
154 The trial was preceded by considerable procedural skirmishing. See Wirtz v.
Wheaton Glass Co., 253 F. Supp. 93 (D.N.J. 1966) (demand for jury trial denied); With v.
Wheaton Glass Co., 17 BNA Wage & Hour Cas, 412, 54 CCH Lab. Cas. 'II 31,829 (D.N.J.
1966) (informers' privilege upheld).
25
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
that: (1) the male and female selector-packers were not performing
"equal work"; 155
 and, (2) even if they were performing "equal work"
within the meaning of the EPA, the admitted wage differential was
justified as being based on a "factor other than sex." 156 Wheaton
contended, and the district court found, that "as a matter of opera-
tional and economic necessity," 157 selector-packers were required to
perform the work of snap-up boys during limited periods of the
work day when various cooling ovens were shut down. Under the
collective bargaining agreement, however, while male selector-
packers could be assigned at any time to perform such work, the
female selector-packers could not. Wheaton therefore argued not
only that the job content of the two positions was unequal, but also
that the work flexibility of the males constituted a valid basis for
paying the wage differential.
In reaching its decision, the district court examined the legisla-
tive history of the EPA, and concluded that Congress intended the
term "equal work" to mean "substantially identical." 158 On that
basis, the court found that the performance of some snap-up boy
duties by the males constituted "substantial differences" between the
jobs performed by the two sexes, "thereby justifying the disparity in
their wages." 159 The court also found that the availability of male
selector-packers to perform the work of snap-up boys during shut-
downs was an element of flexibility which was of an economic value
to the company, and, as such, a "factor other than sex" which
legitimized payment of the wage differentia1. 16°
The Department of Labor appealed the district court's decision
on three grounds: first, that the district court's construction of the
statutory term "equal work" rested upon an erroneous interpretation
of the legislative intent; second, that the contention of male
"flexibility" in job performance was not a "factor other than sex;"
third, that in any event, the violation had been proven as to all the
women, since at least some of the higher paid men performed little
or none of the extra duties which were claimed as the basis of the
wage differentia1. 161
 After receiving voluminous briefs and hearing
oral arguments on two separate occasions, 162 the Third Circuit
155 29 U.S.C.	 206(d)(1) (1970).
156 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(iv) (1970).
157
 Wirtz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 284 F. Supp. at 27.
155 Id, at 32.
159 Id. at 33.
160 Id. at 30-31, 33.
161
 Brief for Appellant at 25, 57, 52, Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir,
1970).
162 The Third Circuit itself ordered reargument and requested the submission of supple-
mental briefs on specific questions presented by the court. The questions presented as a result
of the court's rehearing order were:
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reversed the district court's judgment for Wheaton Glass, holding
that the term "equal work" required only that the compared jobs be
"substantially equal," not identical. 163 Additionally, the court re-
jected all arguments as to flexibility, noting that job content "restric-
tions on females similar to those imposed by Wheaton Glass have
been held illegal under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . .,)164 The
court also stressed that while individual differences in work capac-
ity may be a proper basis for a wage differential, sex-based group
criteria are not acceptable.
Further, the court dissected the work content of the extra duties
performed by the males and found the actual time spent by the
males on such duties to be minimal. The court indicated that, even
if it had been established that the extra duties consumed a substan-
tial amount of time of all the male selector packers, there would still
be no basis for the differential since this extra service was ordinarily
performed by snap-up boys, who were only paid two cents more per
hour than the females. In other words, "there would be no rational
explanation why men who at times perform work paying two cents
per hour more than their female counterparts should for that reason
receive 211/2 cents per hour more than females for the work they do
in common." 165
Following the denial of Wheaton's motion for rehearing by
the Third Circuit, and of its petition for writ of certiorari by the
Supreme Court,'" the case was remanded to the district court with
instructions to enter an appropriate judgment in favor of the Secre-
tary of Labor. Wheaton's attorneys, however, decided that they had
only lost a battle, not the war. In opposing the Secretary's proposed
form of judgment, Wheaton expressed its willingness to raise the
Can a 10% differential (or any differential) in favor of male selector-packers over female
selector-packers be justified under the Equal Pay Act on the basis of the advantage of
flexibility to the employer in male selector-packers availability for assignment to various
unskilled tasks, when it appears that female selector-packers perform skilled selector-packer
work 98% of their time while male selector-packers do skilled work only 81% of the time, and
that "snap-up boys" receive 2 cents per hour more than female selector-packers although
nearly all of the work they do is clearly unskilled?
To what extent does the Civil Rights Act of 1964 affect the construction of the Equal Pay
Act of 1963?
Is there any evidence in the record which would indicate discrimination in arriving at the
two classifications of male and female selector-packers?
See Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 1, 7, 10, Shultz v. Wheaton Glass, 421 F.2d 259 (3d
Cir. 1970).
163 Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d at 265.
164 Id. at 262 n.4. The cases cited by the court were; Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
416 F.Zd 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.Zd 228 (5th Cir.
1969).
'" Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d at 263.
166 398 U.S. 905 (1970). See Memorandum of Respondent in Opposition, Wheaton Glass
Co. v. Shultz, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
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pay scale for female selector-packers to that of their male counter-
parts, but would agree to pay back wages only from the date on
which certiorari was denied. Wheaton made a de novo attack on the
subject matter jurisdiction of a district court to award back wages in
any case involving legal issues not previothly settled by the
courts)" In essence Wheaton argued that the "novel issue" test,
which at that time was applicable to actions brought under section
16(c) of the FLSA,'" should also be applicable to a section 17 169
injunctive action.
Wheaton's arguments were rejected in toto by the district
cour0 7° and ultimately that court's decision was affirmed by the
Third Circuit."' As a result, some 2,168 past and present female
selector-packers were paid a total of $901,602, which included in-
terest in the amount of $112,233) 72 Undoubtedly, as was noted by
one legal writer, the Wheaton Glass case "breathed new life into the
effort to eliminate female wage discrimination." 173
VII. IDENTITY VS. COMPARABILITY
The obligation of an employer under the EPA to accord equal
wage treatment to its male and female employees employed in the
same establishment is contingent on the men and women, who are
the subjects of the comparison, engaging in equal work on jobs
performed under similar working conditions, and requiring equal
skill, effort, and responsibility) 74
 In the absence of equal work, no
issue of sex discrimination in wages under the EPA arises. A
definitional analysis of the word "equal" is, therefore, of critical
importance.
The word "equal" is defined as: "of the same measure, quan-
tity, amount, or number as another or others . . identical in
mathematical value or logical denotation." 175 In the Congressional
debate prior to enactment of the final bill, there was much discus-
sion as to whether an equal pay standard should require identical or
comparable duties. The word "identical" denotes: "showing exact
likeness: characterized by such entire agreement in qualities and
' 67 Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 319 F. Supp. at 230-31.
166 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1970). The "novel issue" limitation was removed by the Fair
Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 26, 88 Stat. 73 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 615, 637,
169 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1970).
' 7° Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 319 F. Supp. at 229.
171
 Hodgson v. Wheaton Glass Co., 446 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1971).
172
 Memorandum of Morag Simchak, Chief, Branch of Equal Pay Discrimination, U.S.
Dep't of Labor (Jan. 1974).
173 Murphy, supra note 148, at 616.
174 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1970).
175 Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged 766 (1966 ed.).
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attributes that identity may be assumed . . . having such close
resemblance and such minor differences as to be essentially the
same." 176 On the other hand, the word "comparable" is defined as
"capable of being compared . . . having enough like characteristics
or qualities to make comparison appropriate . . . permitting or
inviting comparison often in one or two salient points only . . . " 177
Insight into the legislative intent can be gleaned from a review of
certain proposals which were advanced during the final efforts to
enact anti-sex discrimination legislation.
In 1962, the Kennedy Administration introduced a measure
which proposed the standard of equal pay for comparable work. 178
After the House Committee on Education and Labor favorably
reported the Administration's bill, an amendment was offered to
narrow that standard to one requiring equality of work. Indeed, the
sponsor offered the amendment with the avowed intention of reduc-
ing the "tremendous latitude" which the word "comparable" would
allow.'" The then Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg, however,
wrote in support of the "comparable" standard and his remarks
were introduced in the House debate:
"Equal" may be interpreted to have a rigid connota-
tion such as "exact uniformity," "of the same measure,"
and so on—incompatible with an effective equal pay law
which necessarily must be applied on the basis of similarity
between one job in relation to another job but not the
exactness of two jobs.
If a showing of equality was a requisite to establish
the requirement of equal pay, the conscious introduction of
one slight and trivial factor might be considered sufficient
to justify a lower wage rate.'"
Subsequently, in 1963 a measure was proposed by Congress-
woman Florence Dwyer of New Jersey which contained the phrase:
"work of comparable character." 181 Simultaneous with the introduc-
tion of the Dwyer legislation in the House of Representatives, the
Senate was also confronted with a bill, sponsored by Senator Clif-
ford Case of New Jersey, which contained identical language insofar
as it sought to proscribe sex based wage differentials "for work of
comparable character on jobs the performance of which requires
176 Id. at 1122-23.
177 Id. at 461.
178 H.R. 11677, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
179 108 Cong. Rec. 14767 (1962) (remarks of Congresswoman St. George, N.Y.).
18° Id. at 14768.
181 H.R. 4022, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
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comparable skills." 182 Nevertheless, despite the Secretary's admoni-
tion, a bill was introduced by Congresswoman Edith Green of
Oregon which contained the phrase "equal work." 183 These bills are
cited as illustrative of the fact that the Congress, in debating the
phraseology of the potential statutory standard, was clearly aware of
the options presented to it. On the one hand, it might have adopted
a standard requiring identity of work; on the other hand, it might
have selected the more liberal approach which would merely have
necessitated comparability as the requisite for equal wages.
Significantly, as evidenced by the final bill, in its selection of
the word "equal," Congress rejected the "comparable" standard and
opted for a more stringent test. Equally significant, however, is that
in selecting the phrase "equal work," there was no intention to
require that jobs be identical before a comparison could be made. In
fact, any belief to the contrary was labeled as "obviously ridiculous"
by the Chairman of the Senate Labor Subcommittee.'"
Accordingly, the equal pay standard requires that the jobs be
somewhere on a scale between absolute identity and mere compara-
bility. Eleven years after passage of the EPA, however, there
remains widespread debate regarding this standard. The degree of
"equality" needed to establish a violation is still not susceptible of
precise definition. Thus, the Fifth Circuit, in Brennan v. City
Stores, Inc., 185
 addressed itself to this elusive concept:
While the standard of equality is clearly higher than mere
comparability yet lower than absolute identity, there re-
mains an area of equality under the Act the metes and
bounds of which are still indefinite. . [N]o talismanic
words will resolve the ambiguities presented by the phrase
"equal skill, effort, and responsibility." Like many other
legal concepts, that of equality under the Equal Pay Act is
susceptible of definition only by contextual study.'"
In order better to understand the meaning of equal pay for
equal work, it is necessary to follow the sound advice of the Fifth
Circuit by analyzing several of the cases which have construed that
phrase. However, initially it must be stressed that, although there
182 S. 882, 88th Cong., 1st Sess, (1963).
'" H.R, 3861, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
184
 There is a rather lengthy discussion in the Senate Report No. 176 on the methods
and procedures which the Department (of Labor] should utilize to determine which
jobs do involve equal skills, efforts, and responsibilities.
That report discussion makes it clear that it is not the intent of the Senate that
jobs must be identical. Such a conclusion would obviously be ridiculous.
109 Cong. Rec. 9761 (1963) (remarks of Senator McNamara, Mich.).
188 479 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1973).
188
 Id. at 238-39.
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may be conflicting views as to the connotation of "equal work,"
there is absolutely no reasonable dispute as to the meaning of the
phrase "equal pay." Any disparity in pay between men and women
who come within the EPA standard is proscribed unless justified
under one of the statutory exceptions. 187
In 1966, in the first case tried under the EPA, the court in
Wirtz v. Basic, Inc.'" confirmed that it was not the legislative
intent to construe the phrase "equal work" to mean identical work
and that insubstantial differences should be ignored.' 89 Six months
later, this rationale received added support in Wirtz v. Rainbo
Baking Co. 19° wherein the Court made explicit what was and is
obvious: jobs are seldom identical and small differences are of no
consequence where the work is substantially the same."'
Significantly, therefore, in the landmark Wheaton Glass case,' 92
 the
Third Circuit concluded that "equal" could not have been intended
to mean identical, since "[a]ny other interpretation would destroy
the remedial purposes of the Act."' 93
 With the advent of Wheaton
Glass an unbroken line of cases began which, regardless of whether
or not a violation was found, have recognized the principle that
equality means something less than identical, to wit "substantially
equal."'" On that basis, the more recent cases have further recog-
nized that job content differences do not in themselves necessarily
preclude application of the EPA standard. 195
 For the issue in de-
termining equality is not whether the employees are performing
I" Hodgson v. American Bank of Commerce, 447 F.2d 416, 420 (5th Cir. 1971).
' 88 256 F, Supp. 786 (D. Nev. 1966).
188
 Id. at 790. As a somewhat humorous aside, the court's prefatory language is worthy
of note:
The case for the plaintiff was presented by a feminine attorney of the Depart-
ment of Labor, resisted by a masculine attorney of the Nevada Bar and considered
by a Judge who, for the purposes of this case at least, must be sexless, a possibility
not apparent when the oath of office was taken and one which may bespeak the
appointment of older judges.
Id. at 787.
19° 303 F. Supp. 1049 (E.ID. Ky. 1967).
181
 Id. at 1052.
192 Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905
(19 70).
193 421 F.2d at 265.
184
 See, e.g., Hodgson v. Fairmont Supply Co., 454 F.2d 490, 493 (4th Cir. 1972); Shultz
v. American Can Co.-Dixie Prod., 424 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir. 1970); Hodgson v. Braswell
Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 20 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 1025, 1026, 69 CCH Lab. Cas.
1 32,808 (N.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd sub nom., Brennan v. Braswell Motor Freight Lines, Inc.,
480 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1973). See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 94 S. Ct. 2223 (1974),
which cites Wheaton Glass and notes that "it is, now well settled that jobs need not be
identical in every respect . . . ." Id. at 2232 n,24.
1 " See, e.g., Brennan v. Houston Endowment, Inc., 21 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 561,
563-64, 73 CCH Lab. Cas, ¶ 33,022 (S.D. Tex. 1974). Brennan v. Farmers & Merchants Nat'l
Bank, 21 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 113, 114, 71 CCH Lab. Cas. 32,905 (D. Neb. 1973).
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different duties, but whether the duties that they are performing are
substantially equal in terms of skill, effort, and responsibility.
In a comparison of jobs which are substantially equal,. job
titles, job classifications, and job evaluations are not controlling.
Rather the application of the Act is dependent on the job require-
ments and the duties actually performed by the employees involved
in the comparison. ' 96 The fact that jobs may have different titles is
no bar to a comparison under the EPA.'" By the same token, the
fact that two jobs may bear identical titles does not mean that the
work performed by the employees is equal. Job evaluations are some
evidence of equality or inequality of work; however, they are not
conclusive. 198 For example, if the male and female duties add up to
the same number of points under an evaluation system, this does not
necessarily mean that the jobs are equal.' 99 The holding of the
Seventh Circuit in Hodgson v. Miller Brewing Co. zoo must be
stressed—that the EPA "does not authorize courts to equalize wages
merely because they find that two substantially different jobs are
worth the same monetarily to the employer and therefore should be
paid the same wages. However, `[t]here is evidence that Congress
intended that jobs of the same or closely related character should
be compared in applying the equal pay for equal work stan-
dard . "201 Conversely, the fact that two jobs under evaluation
are deemed to have different point values does not prevent the
application of the equal pay standard. 2 °2
Likewise, enforcement experience establishes that often the
employees are doing either more or less work than is provided in the
job description. Thus, in Hodgson v. Brookhaven General
Hospital, 203
 the Fifth Circuit recognized that certain employees'
duties exceeded those mentioned in the job description, and agreed
that the trial court was correct in placing its reliance on the tes-
196 29 C.F.R. § 800.121 (1973). See Wirtz v. Muskogee Jones Store Co., 293 F. Supp.
1034, 1037 (E.D. Okla. 1968); Wirtz v. Rainbo Baking Co., 303 F. Supp. 1049, 1052 (E.D.
Ky. 1967).
197
 "Application of the equal pay standards . . . is not dependent on job classifications,
such as 'heavy work' or 'light work' . . . but depends, rather on actual job requirements and
performance." Wirtz v. Versail Mfg., Inc., 18 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 527, 529, 58 CCH
Lab. Cas. 32,047 (N.D. Ind. 1968). See also Hodgson v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 329 F.
Supp. 102, 104 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
198 See Brennan v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896, 899 (5th Cir. 1974).
199
 Under a job evaluation system, the point value for a male clerk might be equal to the
point value for a female bookkeeper, yet there could be no comparison for purposes of the
EPA. 29 C.F.R. § 800.120 (1973). "The points for the two positions may be equal, but the
jobs themselves might be substantially different." Krumbeck v. John Oster Mfg. Co., 313 F.
Supp. 257, 260 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
2" 457 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1972).
201 Id. at 227.
2172 29 C.F.R. § 800.121 (1973).
20) 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970).
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timony of employees rather than on artificial job descriptions. 204
For, it is manifest that blind reliance on job descriptions which may
have substantial discrepancies when compared with the actual
duties of an employee would be "too wide a door through which the
content of the Act would disappear." 205
The EPA prescribes that the performance of "equal work" must
require equal skill, effort and responsibility. These three require-
ments have been construed in virtually all judicial decisions and
interpretations as constituting three separate tests. 206 In the in-
terpretations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor, it is patent
that where the amount or degree of skill required to perform one job
is substantially different than that required to perform another job,
the jobs may not be compared even though they may be equal in all
other respects. 207 The same position' is expressed in the analysis of
"equal effort."208 In discussing equal responsibility the interpreta-
tions are not quite as explicit, but they do unmistakably suggest that
differences in responsibility can render two jobs unequal for pur-
poses of the EPA. 209 Thus, in the seminal case under the EPA, the
court held that the plaintiff bore the burden of proving "equal skill,"
"equal effort," and "equal responsibility. ”210
In Hodgson v. Daisy Manufacturing Co. 211 the district court
held that these three criteria should be weighed collectively. The
court found that while certain stock chasing duties performed by the
males required substantial physical effort, such work demanded
little skill or responsibility. Furthermore, the court found that while
the men were so exerting themselves; the females were engaged in
duties which required substantially greater skill and job responsibil-
ity. Based on these findings, the court concluded that the substantial
effort exerted by the males was offset by the substantially greater
skill and responsibility required in the performance of the female
job. 212 This collective approach obviously eases the burden of estab-
lishing an equal pay violation.
One critical concept, accepted by every court before which the
question has been raised, is that concurrent employment of the two
204 Id. at 724. See also Shultz v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 305 F. Supp. 424 (N.D. Tex.
1969).
205 Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d at 265-66.
200 See Brennan v. J.M. Fields, Inc., 488 F.2d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 1973), petition for cert.
filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3511 (U.S. March 5, 1974), quoting from 29 C.F.R. § 800.122 (1973).
2" 29 C.F.R. § 800.125 (1973).
2" 29 C.E.R. § 800.127 (1973) (emphasis added).
249
	
C.F.R. §§ 800.129, 800.130 (1973).
210 Wirtz v. Basic, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 786, 790 (D. Nev. 1966) (emphasis added).
21 I 317 F. Supp. 538 (W.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd on this point, but rev'd on other grounds,
445 F.2d 823 (8th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
212 317 F. Supp. at 551-52.
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sexes need not be established in order to conduct an EPA compari-
son. Thus, if women replace higher paid males and perform work
which is substantially equal to that which was formerly performed
by the males, the equal pay standard is violated. The employer's
obligation to pay members of both sexes the higher wage paid for
the job cannot lawfully be avoided by replacing male employees
with lower paid female employees or vice versa. 2 ' 3
In Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co. ,214 for instance, the Fifth
Circuit found violations of the EPA in comparing a female super-
visor with the male whom she replaced. The male supervisor re-
signed and was immediately replaced by the lower paid woman. In
fact, when the Secretary instituted suit, four and one-half years after
the male's resignation, the woman was still earning less than what
the male had been paid. The court held that the wage discrimina-
tion was a continuing violation and ordered the recovery of back
wages for the two years preceding the suit. 215 This holding is
important not only for the reason that it affirms the concept that
concurrent employment is not the sine qua non in these cases, but
also for the reason that it sanctions the right of the plaintiff to
establish violations based on a course of conduct occurring outside
the period of the statute of limitations. In other words, the court
allowed the Secretary of Labor to go back over four and one-half
years to establish the fact of discrimination, but limited the back
wage recovery to the two-year statutory period.
VIII. EQUAL SKILL
The administrative interpretations of the EPA define the term
"skill" as including consideration of such factors as experience,
training, education and ability, each measured by the performance
requirements of the particular jobs involved in the comparison. 2 ' 6
The fact that an employee possesses skills which are not required for
the performance of his job duties cannot be considered in measuring
equality of skill. 217
 As one court has held:
[Title concern is not with the capabilities, skill, knowledge
and expertise of the employees in general, but with the
expertise required for a particular job classification. For
example, a candy salesman or a ribbon clerk may have
	2'3
	
v. Saxonburg Ceramics, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 1139, 1146 (WM. Pa. 1970); Wirtz
v. Koller Craft Plastic Prod., Inc., 296 F. Supp. 1195, 1198 (E.D. Mo. 1968); 29 C.F.R.
§ 800.114 (1973).
214 475 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1973).
215
 475 F.2d at 1048-51.
	2'6
	 C.F.R. § 800.125 (1973).
217 Id.
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expertise in business administration, tailoring, automobile
mechanics, or space science. However, job pay require-
ments may be determined by the expertise required to
accomplish a particular job such as candy or ribbon sales
without reference to skills in unrelated areas. 2 ' 8
Insight into the meaning of the word "skill" as used in the EPA
may be obtained from a review of the decided cases. In Wirtz v.
Dennison Manufacturing Co. 219 the men who worked the third
shift, as opposed to the women who worked the first and second
shifts, were required to set up machinery before starting work on
a new order and were required to make repairs and adjustments
on the machines when a malfunction occurred. The set-up work oc-
curred regularly and certain repairs could exceed 20 minutes of the
males' time. All of the male employees on the third shift had either
passed a mechanical aptitude test or had some mechanical ability.
Based on these facts, the court found that the men possessed and
exercised, to a substantial degree, special skill which was not re-
quired of the women who acted solely as machine operators. 22 °
In hospital and nursing home cases under the EPA, duties
which are asserted to require "skills" have been analyzed. One such
duty is that of catheterization which has been labeled "a skilled
nursing function" by a number of district courts. 221
 In the Brookha-
ven General Hospital 222
 case, however, the Fifth Circuit found that
catheterizations performed by male orderlies, but not by female
aides, did not warrant the payment of higher wages to the men. In
arriving at this conclusion, the court considered factors apart from
the duty per se, taking cognizance of the trial judge's findings that:
(I) the males devoted an insignificant amount of time to this duty;
(2) the duty had been performed in the past by female aides; and (3)
the women performed other duties which required as much skill as
218
 Hodgson v. Cain-Sloan Co., 21 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 1, 3, 71 CCH Lab. Cas.
11 32,880 (M.D. Tenn. 1973), aff'd and vacated in part sub nom. Brennan v. Cain-Sloan Co.,
21 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 145, 74 CCH Lab. Cas. 33,126 (6th Cir. 1974).
215 265 F, Supp. 787 (D. Mass. 1967).
22"
 Id, at 790. But see Wirtz v. Rainbo Baking Co., 303 F. Supp. 1049, 1051 (E.D. Ky.
1967) (minor machine adjustment, which "does not involve any peculiar skill," cannot justify
a wage differential).
221
 Hodgson v. Golden Isles Nursing Home, Inc., 19 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 903, 905,
64 CCH Lab. Cas. 32,445 (S.D. Fla, 1971), aff'd sub nom. Hodgson v. Golden Isles
Convalescent Homes, Inc. 468 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). See also Hodgson v.
Good Shepherd Hosp., 327 F. Supp. 143, 145 (E.D. Tex. 1971) ("special skill developed by
training"). The catheterization procedure is described in Hodgson v. William & Mary Nursing
Hotel, BNA 20 Wage & Hour Cas. 10, 19-20, 65 CCH Lab. Cas. ¶ 32,497 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
See Comment, Equal Pay: The Hospital-Nursing Home Dilemma, 7 U. Richmond L. Rev.
303 (1972).
222
 Hodgson v, Bookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir, 1970).
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was involved in catheterization. 223
 Therefore, it is apparent that the
mere possession of a skill 224
 will not justify a differential, if the duty
which necessitates the skill is only performed for an insignificant
amount of time. Moreover, a skill needed in the performance of
certain duties performed by employees of the higher-paid sex will
not validate the higher wage if employees of the lower-paid sex
perform the same or other duties which require equal skill.
Differences merely in the kinds of duties performed 225 do not
negate the presence of equal skill if the basic duties are of a closely
related character. 226
 Rather, the critical consideration is the amount
or degree of skill required to perform the respective jobs. The
Department of Labor adopts the position that, regardless of the
frequency of its exercise, if the same degree of skill is needed for the
performance of the . two jobs, there is equality of ski11. 227 The
frequency of exercise of the skill would only be a determinative
consideration where the skilled duty is performed for an
insignificant amount of time. In such a situation, due to the infre-
quency of exercise, the skill is virtually not needed in the perfor-
mance of the job, and thus it cannot serve as a basis for a wage
differential. 228
It should also be noted that where an additional skill is shown,
an employer may not justify a wage differential for all hours, if the
differential is predicated on a skill used for only a limited and
identifiable period of time. 229
 This is so even though the duty in
223
 Shultz v. Bookhaven Gem Hosp., 305 F. Supp. 424, 425 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
224
 Other hospital and nursing home cases have treated as "skilled duties . . . (requiring)
additional training and know-how" such tasks as setting up tractions and oxygen tents and
performing inhalation therapy. Hodgson v. Maison Miramon, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 843, 848
(E.D. La. 1972) and cases cited therein.
225
 Brennan v. Houston Endowment, Inc., 21 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 561, 562, 73
CCH Lab. Cas. 11 33,022 (S.D. Tex. 1974), involved custodial personnel. The court treated as
skilled duties the operation by men of floor buffers, wet vacuums and carpet pile lifters and
compared those operations with the skill of cleaning venetian blinds with tools as performed
by women.
226
 The court in Houston Endowment concluded that the "skills" exercised by both sexes
were equal. This conclusion was reached despite a finding that "the men regularly spent a
substantial portion of their time performing a type of janitorial work which was not identical
to the type of janitorial work which occupied a substantial portion of the women's time." Id.
at 563.
227 29 C.F.R.
	 800.125 (1973).
225 See Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970).
219
 See, e.g., Wirtz v. Rainbo Baking Co., 303 F. Supp. 1049, 1052 (E.D. Ky. 1967);
Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 421, 263 (3d Cir. 1970). This concept applies as well
to other elements of the equal pay standard:
There could be no effective enforcement of the equal pay provisions if differentials
between sexes were permitted for all hours worked because of the substantially
different working conditions and responsibilities entailed in a specific part of the
work performed at identifiable times and places,
Wirtz v. Basic, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 786, 791 (D. Nev. 1966).
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question might entail substantially greater skill (effort and/or re-
sponsibility). Conversely, of course, -if an employer can establish
through business records that any given employee performs a duty
which is substantially different during a certain identifiable period
of time, the employer is entitled to pay a higher rate to the employee
during the particular time in which the duty is performed. 23 °
IX. EQUAL EFFORT
The next criterion under the EPA is that of effort. The term
"effort" is defined as "the physical or mental exertion needed for the
performance of the job." 23 ' It is not the differences in kinds of effort
which are to be considered in evaluating the equality of two jobs,
but rather the differences in amount or degree of effort which is
actually expended in the performance of the jobs. 232 Of the four
tests which comprise the equal pay standard, the effort factor has
proven the most quantifiable. Consequently, the overwhelming ma-
jority of cases under the EPA have involved discussions of equality
of effort; and, as a result, this element of the equal pay standard is
more clearly defined than those of skill, responsibility, and working
conditions.
If an employer relies on effort as the basis for a disparity in pay
between male and female employees, essentially three tests must be
met: (1) the effort must in fact be greater; (2) the duty or duties
which require the extra effort must consume a significant amount of
time of all those employees whose added wages are sought to be
justified in terms of the extra effort; and, (3) the extra effort must
have a value commensurate with the differential. 233
In order to counter successfully a charge of EPA discrimina-
tion, it is not sufficient merely to establish that one or twit of the
23° Hodgson v. Daisy Mfg. Co., 317 F. Supp. 538, 551-52 (W,D. Ark. 1970), aff 'd, 445
F.2d 823 (8th Cir, 1971) (per curiam).
In retail store cases which have arisen under the EPA, the tailoring and fitting of clothing
has been presented by the employer as a duty requiring skill. In Hodgson v. City Stores, Inc.,
332 F. Supp. 942 (M.D. Ala. 1971), the defendant argued that the male tailor's job was more
skilled than that performed by the female seamstress. The tailor made sleeve and trouser
alterations, hemmed and occasionally altered suit collars. The seamstress altered sleeves,
hemmed skirts, made other skirt and dress alterations and occasionally narrowed shoulders.
The two used essentially the same equipment in the performance of their jobs. The district
court found that the work entailed equal skill, id. at 449, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed on
appeal. Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1973). In contrast, however,
another district court held that salesmen who pinned suits for alteration required more skill
than women engaged in pure sales, Hodgson v. Cain-Sloan Co., 21 BNA Wage & Hour Cas.
I, 4, 71 CCH Lab. Cas. 4 32,880 (M.D, Tenn, 1973).
231 29 C.F.R. § 800.127 (1973).
232 Id.
233 Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 725 (5th Cir. 1970). The same
criteria may be applied as well to the "skill" and "responsibility" tests. See Hodgson v.
Fairmont Supply Co., 454 F.2d 490, 493 (4th Cir. 1972).
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above tests are satisfied. Instead, it is imperative that all three
requisites be established. The tests have been formulated to avoid
situations where the differences in effort are merely illusory. These
tests also serve to negate differentials which are sought to be
justified on the basis of duties which are either infrequently per-
formed, or are performed by only some of the employees who
receive the higher wage. Further, the tests serve to disallow wage
differentials based on duties which, when performed by other em-
ployees in the establishment, command a lower rate of pay than is
received by the employees whose rate is sought to be justified in
terms of these duties. 234
In Brookhaven General Hospital, the trial court found as a fact
that the primary duty of the female aides and male orderlies was
general patient care and assistance. 235 Notwithstanding this identity
of duties, the hospital argued on appeal that the jobs were substan-
tially distinguishable in terms of the "secondary and tertiary" duties
exercised by the two classifications. 236 On remand to the district
court for further evidence, it was found that the added duties were
performed off the regularly assigned station for other than the
regularly assigned patients. It was estimated that the female aides
devoted 2% of their time to the off-station duties and the male
orderlies devoted 20-25% of their time to these differing duties.
Among the extra duties of the orderlies were tasks which allegedly
required substantially greater effOrt, such as the lifting of patients,
setting up of traction, assisting in the application of casts, subduing
violent patients, moving equipment, assisting in the emergency
room and transporting supplies. Nonetheless, the district court con-
cluded that "[t]he orderlies do not exert significantly more effort
than aides because of these 'secondary and tertiary' duties, which
consume only a minor and insignificant amount of the time of the
orderlies who have been considered as the counterparts of the
aides."237 On appeal once again, the decision was affirmed. 238
234
 The court in Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970)
stated:
We are persuaded that this approach to the application of the statutory "equal
effort" criterion is in keeping with the fundamental purposes of the Equal Pay Act,
and adopt it here. Employers may not be permitted to frustrate the purposes of the
Act by calling for extra effort only occasionally, or only from one or two male
employees, or by paying males substantially more than females for the performance
of tasks which command a low rate of pay when performed full time by other
personnel in the same establishment.
Id. at 725.
133
 Shultz v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 305 F. Supp. 424, 425 (N.D. Tex. 1969),
236 Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d at 723.
237
 Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 20 BNA Wage & Hour Cos. 54, 55, 65 CCH
Lab. Cas.	 32,520 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
23S
 Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 470 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
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Thus, it is manifest that the particular duty is not the sole focal
point in determining equality of effort. Rather, the time factor can
be conclusive. Moreover, the district court regarded as significant
the fact that the time devoted to such duties varied considerably
from orderly to orderly, yet their respective pay rates did not vary
accordingly. 239 This ruling negates the possibility that an employer
can justify a differential predicated on effort which is performed by
only some of the members of the higher paid sex. For if one or more
members of the higher paid sex either does not perform the duty
requiring the extra effort or only performs it for an insignificant
amount of time, then the employer's reasoning that he pays more for
the performance of such duty is without logic.
In Hodgson v. Golden Isles Convalescent Homes, Inc. 2, 40 how-
ever, a different panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed a lower court
decision which found that aides and orderlies were not engaged in
the performance of equal work. The appellate court distinguished
that case from its previous ruling in Brookhaven General Hospital 24 '
and from another lower court decision in a similar action. 242 The
Fifth Circuit opined that in those earlier cases, unlike the case
before it, many of the duties which the men performed were also
performed by the women.'" The rationale in such cases is that if
some of the members of the lower-paid sex perform the duty, and
yet continue to receive the lower wage, the employer's argument
that the performance of the duty has an added economic value is
without merit. 244 The Golden Isles decision stresses that there can
be no universal determination that all aides and orderlies perform
equal work in all hospitals. 245
Another theory, which has surfaced in several of the cases
concerning medical care facilities, is that the presence of a male
Without unnecessarily belaboring the facts and findings below, Brookhaven's order-
lies did not expend significantly greater effort in performing primary, secondary or
tertiary duties. Indeed, the record supports the affirmative statement that orderlies
and aides expended substantially equal effort in performing all of their duties,
however divided and ranked.
Id. at 730.
239 The court found, for example, that while one orderly devoted up to 15% of his total
working time to off-station duties, another spent only an occasional and minimal amount of
time away from the routine duties. Despite the time disparity, both men received equal
wages. Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen, Hosp., 20 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. at 55.
24° 468 F,2d 1256 (5th Cir, 1972) (per curiam).
24t 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970).
242
 Hodgson v. George W. Hubbard Hosp., 351 F. Supp. 1295 (M.D. Tenn, 1971).
243 468 F.2d at 1258,
2" 351 F. Supp. at 1297-98, The court in Hubbard found that the males and females
"performed and assisted each other in performing" the so-called extra duties which were
alleged to have been assigned only to males. Id.
245 468 F.2d at 1258.
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orderly provides security to patients and other employees at the
institution. 246
 To the extent that such a factor merely represents
some type of "nice to have a man around the house" argument, it is
without merit. For "Nile presence of male orderlies is not a duty
that is performed" 247
 within the meaning of the EPA. Indeed, this
approach credits all males and no females with the ability to provide
a measure of psychological security, which conjures up the very
stereotypes which the EPA so evidently sought to avoid. 248
Nevertheless, there are situations in which this otherwise in-
valid psychological argument does have legitimacy, most promi-
nently in the case of facilities in which there is an actual and
recurring need to restrain violent patients. One such case, Shultz v.
Kentucky Baptist Hospital 249
 involved alleged violations in the
psychiatric unit of the defendant-hospital. The evidence established
that, in addition to other regular duties, male orderlies were re-
quired to restrain patients during and after shock treatment and to
oversee suicidally-inclined patients. Significantly, nearly all the
female nurse's aides testified that they would not work in the
psychiatric unit in the absence of a male orderly. Based on those
findings, the court determined that the male orderlies assured se-
curity and provided protection, and therefore declined to find an
EPA vioIation. 2"
It is essential to note that Kentucky Baptist and other similar
cases 2" dealt with mental care institutions in which there was not
only a possible threat to security, but actual outbreaks of violence.
In each case, male orderlies were regularly called upon to restrain
146 See, e.g., Shultz v. Kentucky Baptist Hosp., 19 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 403, 62
CCH Lab. Cas. 9 32,296 (W.D. Ky. 1969).
247
 Hodgson v. Cook, 20 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 941, 948, 69 CCH Lab. Cas. 9 32,782
(C.D. Cal. 1972). See also Hodgson v, St. Elizabeth Hosp., 20 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 1242,
1245, 70 CCH Lab. Cas. 9 32,863 (E.D. Ky. 1973) (noncontested); Hodgson v. South Shore
Convacare, Inc., 20 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 490, 492, 67 CCH Lab. Cas. 9 32,628 (N.D. Ill.
1972). Contra, Hodgson v. Golden Isles Nursing Home, Inc., 19 BNA Wage & Hour Cas.
903, 64 CCH Lab. Cas. 11 32,445 (S.D. Fla, 1971) aff'd sub nom. Hodgson v. Golden Isles
Convalescent Homes, Inc., 468 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
241
 See Shultz v. First Victoria Nat'l Bank, 420 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1969), noting as "the
Congressional purpose: The elimination of those subjective assumptions and traditional
stereotyped misconceptions regarding the value of women's work." Id. at 656.
249
 19 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 403, 62 CCH Lab. Cas. 9 32,296 (W.D. Ky. 1969).
250
 19 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. at 410. This matter is considered under equality of
effort, despite the court's apparent treatment of the duty as involving all three criteria—skill,
effort and responsibility: "It is in this duty performed by the orderly who possesses the skill
and the physical ability and strength to do this job that particularly distinguishes his respon-
sibilities from that of the nurses' aide." Id. at 406-07.
251
 Hodgson v. Anclote Manor Foundation, 21 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 290, 72 CCH
Lab. Cas. 9 32,957 (M.D. Fla. 1973); Brennan v. Cenco Hosp. & Convalescent Homes Corp.,
21 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 29, 71 CCH Lab. Cas. 9 32,908 (S.D. Tex. 1973). See also
Hodgson v. Good Shepherd Hosp., 327 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Tex. 1971) (alcoholic and
psychiatric units).
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unruly patients and provide security in the actual performance of
other work. Therefore, even where some orderlies did not have
occasion to restrain more than a few patients, their presence pro-
vided security and peace of mind to other employees. Equally pa-
tent, however, is that a general care hospital or nursing home will
have but a minimal actual need to restrain violent patients. Accord-
ingly, in such institutions, the mere presence of orderlies will pro-
vide no substantial additional peace of mind to other employees and
patients.
One of the most fertile sources of litigation under the EPA has
been the manufacturing industries. In Shultz v. American Can
Co.-Dixie Products 252 the issue of effort was critical to the ultimate
determination. The district court had found that male and female
machine operators were engaged in a process which was "identical
at all times," with the exception that the men loaded the materials
for their machines, whereas the women did not. The materials
consisted of rolls of paper weighing from 50-1000 pounds and con-
tainers of paper blanks weighing up to 1500 pounds. The rolls had
to be moved a few feet and then loaded onto the machines either
manually or mechanically.
In reversing the district court's decision, the Eighth Circuit held
that the handling and loading functions did not involve substantial
additional effort. 253 The appellate court stressed that the male
operators' duties were virtually identical to the female operators'
duties for 93-98% of the male's work time. The court also consid-
ered the fact that although the male operators exerted varying
degrees of effort, no wage differential existed among them. All of
the men received the same pay regardless of the time each devoted
to material handling, regardless of the weight of the materials which
each handled, and regardless of whether the loading of the materials
was effectuated by manual or hydraulic means. Consequently, the
court held that, since the males received the same compensation
regardless of the frequency or amount of effort involved, then such
effort could not have the economic value which the employer sought
to attribute to it. 254
 In view of the weight of the materials,
moreover, it is important to note that the fact that a woman might
be physically unable to perform a certain duty which is assigned to
men does not mean that her job cannot be equated with that of the
252 424 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1970). The following fads are abstracted from Wirtz v.
American Can Co.-Dixie Prod., 288 F. Supp, 14, 22 (W.D. Ark. 1968).
253 424 F.2d at 360-61.
234 Id. A further indication that the material handling duties did not have the value
ascribed by the employer was the fact that the duties were performed "by unskilled workers
receiving . . less than the female machine operators." Id. at 361. See Shultz v. Wheaton
Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 262 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
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males. For it is necessary to scrutinize the job as a whole and to look
at the characteristics of the jobs being compared over a full work
cycle. 255
Any "weight-lifting restrictions imposed on women are closely
scrutinized by the courts and blanket restrictions which do not take
into consideration qualifications of individual employees, such as
physiological makeup and physical capabilities, will not pass mus-
ter" under the EPA. 256 An employer may only rely on such a
restriction where there is "reasonable cause to believe, which is a
factual basis for belief, that all or substantially all women would be
unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job
involved."257 Therefore, where one district court found that the
male-only duties were not "the principal activities" of the job and
that "all of the women were able to perform all of these additional
tasks," the employer's defense of job inequality based on such restric-
tion was rejected. 258
In another recent district court case, 259 it was found that the
male custodians "frequently" and "regularly" operated floor buffers,
wet vacuums, or carpet pile lifters; whereas, the women generally
only used vacuum cleaners. The court found that the only difference
in the jobs was that the men, through exposure and experience,
were familiar with the power-driven equipment and most women
did not have such exposure. There was evidence, however, that one
woman had operated the pile lifter and another woman had oper-
ated a floor buffer for another employer.'" The court held that,
"This lack of exposure, controlled by defendant, does not warrant
any wage differential."261 Rather, the court ruled that "[e]ach em-
ployee must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate his
or her ability to perform the allegedly more strenuous job on a
regular basis;" 262 and, noted that "any wage differential which
might be justified may be applied only to those persons, male or
female, who are individually unable or unwilling to do that work to
which the higher wage is attributable." 263
In Hodgson v. San Diego Unified School District, 264 a com-
255 29 C.F.R.	 800.119 (1973).
256 Shultz v. Saxonburg Ceramics, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 1139, 1146 (N.D. Pa. 1970).
2" Id.
258 Id.
259 Brennan v. Houston Endowment, Inc., 21 BNA Wage & Hour Cas., 561, 73 CCH
Lab. Cas. 9 33,022 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
26° 21 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. at 562.
261
 Id. at 563.
262 RI .
263 Id.
264
 21 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 123, 71 CCH Lab. Cas. 9 32,920 (S.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd
mem. No. 72-2805, 9th Cir., Sept. 5, 1974.
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parison of duties was made between male custodians and female
matron custodians. The court found, inter alia, that the men, but
not the women, were operating and maintaining electric scrubbing
and polishing machines. The evidence established, however, that
matrons were capable of and had, in fact, used the floor scrubbing
and waxing machines. The court therefore held: "The fact that they
are by school regulation not permitted at present to operate them
cannot be used as a basis to distinguish between the duties of
matron custodians and custodians. "26s
In these last three cases, the differences in issue were oc-
casioned not by the physical inadequacies of female employees, but
by an employer's decision to bar them from the performance of the
tasks. These courts appear to be adopting the position that the
restrictions, when controlled by an employer, cannot serve as a basis
for justifying the differential notwithstanding the fact that only the
men perform such tasks.
This approach is more liberal than that taken by the Depart-
ment of Labor in the administrative interpretations, which provide:
[The fact that there is an upper limit set by State law on
the weights that may be lifted by women would not justify
a wage differential to male employees who are not regu-
larly required to lift substantially greater weights or ex-
pend the extra effort necessary to make the jobs unequal.
The requirement of equal pay in such situations depends
on whether the employees involved are actually performing
"equal work" as defined in the Act, rather than on legal
restrictions which may vary from State to State. 266
The interpretations suggest that if all the higher paid males in
an establishment lift weights in excess of 50 pounds, for example,
for a significant period of time and the women are barred from such
work due to state weight lifting restrictions, then the employees are
not performing equal work and the EPA is not violated. The
Department's position, however, is addressed to state protective
laws267
 which, regardless of their present legal status, were origi-
165
 21 Wage & Hour Cas. at 126.
266 29 C.F.R. 4 800.163 (1973).
267 Effect of sex-oriented State employment legislation.
(1) Many States have enacted laws or promulgated administrative regulations
with respect to the employment of females. Among these laws are those which
prohibit or limit the employment of females, e.g., the employment of females in
certain occupations, in jobs requiring the lifting or carrying of weights exceeding
certain prescribed limits, during certain hours of the night, for more than a specified
number of hours per day or per week, and for certain periods of time before and
after childbirth. The Commission has found that such laws and regulations do not
take into account the capacities, preferences, and abilities of individual females and,
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nally enacted for the purpose of benefitting women and were not
intended to be discriminatory. On the other hand, when an em-
ployer removes duties from a woman's job, the motivation behind
this removal may be discriminatory and intended to circumvent the
requirements of the EPA. Debatably, regardless of the motivation,
if the removal or restriction of duties renders the female job unequal
to that of the male, the EPA has no applicability. The EPA requires
equal work as a prerequisite to violation. It can be argued with
considerable persuasion, therefore, that if the work is unequal, there
can be no comparison regardless of the cause of the inequality.
The term "effort" is not, of course, solely restricted to physical
effort, but includes mental effort as Wel1. 268 The balancing of
the possibly greater physical effort of one sex against the possibly
greater mental effort of the opposite sex was considered in Hodgson
v. Daisy Manufacturing Co. 269 The district court found as fact that
the women exclusively operated certain high speed presses which
posed a constant danger to the hands of the operator. Evidence
established that seven women had lost fingers in the operation of
such machines, and one woman testified that every time she per-
formed the operation she experienced fear. It was the testimony of
an industrial psychologist that the risk of injury is a factor causing
mental stress and fatigue. Similarly, an industrial engineer stated
that such a risk necessitated sustained mental and visual attention.
Based on these representations, the court concluded that the risk of
injury, where employees had actually been injured, was evidence
that women expended significant mental exertion not expended by
the men. The court therefore held that the greater physical effort
exerted by the men in certain of their duties was counterbalanced by
the mental effort exerted by the women in operating the high-speed
presses. 270
X. EQUAL RESPONSIBILITY
Relatively few equal pay cases have generated judicial discus-
sions of the concept of equal responsibility in the performance of
jobs. In good part this is a consequence of the fact that level of
therefore, discriminate on the basis of sex. The Commission has concluded that such
laws and regulations conflict with and are superseded by Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Accordingly, such laws will not be considered a defense to an
otherwise established unlawful employment practice or as a basis for-the application
of the bona fide occupational qualification exception, —
29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(b)(1) (1973).
26g
	 C.F.R. § 800.127 (1973).
255 317 F. Supp. 538 (W.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 823 (8th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
2" 317 F. Supp. at 543-44. See also Hodgson v. Allied Supermarkets, Inc., 20 BNA
Wage & Hour Cas. 616, 619, 68 CCH Lab. Cas. SI 32,683 (E.D. Okla. 1972), aff'd, No.
72-1485 (10th Cir., March 26, 1973) (per curiam).
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responsibility is a prime consideration in setting compensation
primarily for executive, administrative and professional jobs; and,
until July 1, 1972, employees in such jobs were exempted from the
protection of the EPA. 27 ' It is to be expected, however, that in the
near future many of these cases will be decided by the courts, and
that development in the judicial analysis of the phrase "equal re-
sponsibility" will result.
The administrative interpretations do set forth a general
guideline to the effect that, "responsibility is concerned with the
degree of accountability required in the performance of the job, with
emphasis on the importance of the job obligation."272 The interpre-
tations provide hypothetical situations where different degrees of
responsibility permit different rates of pay. One such example con-
cerns two employees who perform work which is equal in all re-
spects, except that one employee is required from time to time to
perform supervisory functions in the absence of the regular super-
visor in order to train for a permanent supervisory position. This
added duty is a responsibility which could serve as a basis for a
higher wage. 273 Another example indicates that if two sales clerks'
jobs consist mainly of selling similar merchandise, but one sales
clerk is additionally required to make determinations concerning
acceptance or rejection of customers' checks, the clerk with the
added duty may have a considerable additional degree of responsi-
bility for which that person may be paid at a higher rate. 274 The
interpretations point out that such discretionary functions may have
a material effect on the business operations of the employer. Accord-
ingly, in determining whether certain duties entail greater responsi-
bility, the importance of the duty and the degree of accountability of
the employee are to be considered in relation to the effect which the
performance of the duty has on the employer's operations. Despite
occasional differences in duties, no pay differential is justified where
"the difference in responsibility involved would not appear to be of
a kind that is recognized in wage administration as a significant
factor in determining wage rates." 275
The attempt to define "equal responsibility" requires sifting
through masses of facts in an attempt to isolate the duties which
courts point to as indices of responsibility. The task is complicated
by the courts' frequent failure to characterize precisely the duty in
27'
	
note 46 supra. See Brennan v. American Brands, Inc., 21 BNA Wage & Hour
Cas. 61, 64, 71 CCH Lab. Cas. II 32,903 (W•D. Ky. 1973) (section supervisors found to be
executive employees were exempt from EPA under prior law).
29 C.F.R. § 800.129 (1973).
an 29 C. F. R. § 800.130(a) (1973).
274 29 C.F.R. § 800.130(b) (1973).
275 29 C.F.R. § 1300.130(c) (1973).
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question as one involving a "skill," an "effort," or a "responsibility."
Often, courts will enumerate several duties and then broadly con-
clude that these duties render the jobs either equal or unequal in
terms of all three criteria: skill, effort and responsibility. In such
cases it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain the
specific criterion applied. 276
 The study is further complicated by the
two usages in the cases of the term "responsibility." The word is
often used in a loose sense meaning "duties," 277 and also in its more
precise sense meaning "accountability." 278 Because it is sometimes
difficult to determine in which sense the term is used, it is difficult to
determine what factors are being considered. Notwithstanding these
impediments, some patterns can be discerned upon close scrutiny of
the cases.
In one of the earliest cases under the EPA, 279 male and female
department heads in a retail store were compared. The evidence
established that one man, in addition to the supervisory duties
which he had in common with the women, was in charge of the
store's warehouse and home delivery service. The court found no
violation could be based on the duties of this male, since he exer-
cised more significant and substantial responsibilities than any other
department head. 28° On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit in
Hodgson v. Fairmont Supply Co. 281 reversed a district court finding
that justified a wage differential on the basis of additional job
responsibilities in a warehousing operation. The court held that a
finding of greater responsibility was not warranted: the "decisions
with respect to all of these jobs were subject to being changed by his
superiors, and, therefore, required no more responsibility than his
duties" performed in common with the compared female
employees. 282
In Hodgson v. American Bank of Commerce 283 the defendant
bank sought to justify a wage disparity between a male drive-in
teller "supervisor" and female drive-in tellers. The bank showed
that the man supervised the cashing of checks, helped the other
tellers in balancing out, handled unusual problems, and set the
break periods for the others. In finding that the jobs were equal, the
Fifth Circuit alluded to the fact that the male had no authority
228 See, e.g., Hodgson v. Miller Brewing Co., 457 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1972).
212 See, e.g., Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235, 237 (5th Cir. 1973).
m" See, e.g., Brennan v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896, 899 (5th Cir. 1974).
228 Wirtz v. Muskogee Jones Store Co., 293 F. Supp. 1034 (E.D. Okla. 1968).
mu Id. at 1037.
281 454 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1972), rev'g 19 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 849, 850-51, 64 CCH
Lab. Cas. 9 32,436 (N.D.W.Va. 1970).
282 454 F.2d at 496.
283 447 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1971).
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either to hire or fire, to control work schedules, or to discipline the
other tellers. As for handling unusual problems, there was evidence
that he did so only once a day or once a week. Thus, as was
observed in the discussion of equal effort, the time devoted to the
performance of any given duty is an important consideration. 284
In one recent significant bank case, Brennan v. Victoria Bank
and Trust Co., 285 the court distinguished between the duties of note
tellers and exchange tellers in terms of responsibility. The court
found that a note teller's error in handling a payment on a note
owing to the bank could easily be corrected, whereas this was not
true for the exchange teller, whose duties "were more complicated
and were such that errors could not easily be corrected in the
internal operation of the Bank. "286 The court further found that the
potential loss to the bank was much greater in the exchange teller
position. 287
It is significant that, even when note tellers assisted the ex-
change teller in certain of the latter's duties, the designated ex-
change teller was nonetheless solely accountable and responsible for
all the work. 288 This distinguishes Victoria Bank & Trust from
other cases where members of the lower-paid sex were found to
have performed duties regularly assigned to the higher-paid sex. In
those cases, the overlapping performance of the duties normally
assigned to the higher paid sex rendered those duties invalid as a
basis for the wage differential. 289 Victoria Bank & Trust stresses the
point that even though the note tellers occasionally perform the
duties of the exchange teller, there is no shift in responsibility.
Indeed, the exchange teller's retention of accountability for the
actual labor of others indicates an inequality of responsibility.
Other courts have looked to the amount of supervision em-
ployees received as an indication of the responsibility required by the
job. In one case, the court allowed a higher wage to be paid to male
employees who worked one-half of their shift without supervision,
while the female employees were fully supervised during their entire
shift. 29° Thus, the males' accountability in completing orders as-
signed to them was greater than that of the supervised female
284 It is noteworthy that, although the issue in American Bank of Commerce appeared to
be one of responsibility, the court seemed to treat it as an issue of effort: i.e., mental exertion.
Id. at 422. This is but one example of the difficulty encountered in analyzing court decisions
which discuss equal responsibility.
233 493 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974).
288
 Id, at 899 (emphasis in original).
287 Id.
238 Id.
283 See, e.g., Hodgson v. Montana State Bd. of Educ., 336 F. Supp. 524, 525 (D. Mont.
1972); Shultz v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 305 F. Supp. 424, 425 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
233 Wirtz v, Dennison Mfg, Co., 265 F. Supp. 787, 788-89 (D. Mass. 1967).
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employees. In similar fashion, another court upheld a pay differen-
tial between a male assistant office manager and a female book-
keeper and predicated its finding on the responsibility levels of the
two jobs. 291
 The male was required to use his own independent
judgment in many matters, including expenditures of the employer's
funds. In comparison, the woman was very closely supervised and
not required to exercise her personal discretion in the performance
of her job. 292
Another group of cases, however, has examined not the amount
of supervision exercised over the compared employees, but rather
the supervisory duties of the compared employees themselves. For
example, courts have looked to the supervisory duties of male and
female custodians in situations where the overwhelming majority of
time of both was spent in routine custodial duties. 293 Despite the
performance of certain supervisory tasks by the men, the courts
have held that there was equal work. These decisions were based on
the facts that the men's supervisory tasks took only a small portion
of their time, such tasks were not performed by all men, and several
women also performed similar supervisory tasks. 294
Other cases have looked to the cost of goods and equipment
handled as an index of job responsibility. In one case, a court found
that males had "much greater responsibility" than females, since the
former used materials that were three to five times more expensive,
and equipment that was nearly five times more expensive than that
used by the latter. Any mistakes, therefore, entailed considerably
greater financial loss to the employer and, necessarily, the handling
of such materials carried commensurately greater responsibility. 295
In Hodson v. Behrens Drug Co., 296 the Fifth Circuit conceded
that a male "checker" of narcotics had a greater degree of responsi-
bility than did employees who handled non-narcotic drugs.
Nonetheless, the court rejected the employer's assertion of inequali-
ty. Equal responsibility was found instead on the bases that: the
checking of narcotics entailed only the preparation of a few extra
forms; and, when a woman was assigned to the position she failed to
191
 Kilpatrick v. Sweet, 262 F. Supp. 561, 563-64 (M.D. Fla. 1969). See also, Hodgson
v. Good Shepherd Hosp., 327 F. Supp. 143, 145-46, 148 (E.D. Tex. 1971).
292
 262 F. Supp. at 564.
293
 Hodgson v. Montana State Bd. of Educ., 336 F. Supp. 524, 525 (D. Mont. 1972);
Brennan v. Goose Creek Consol. Indep. School Dist., 21 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 25, 27, 71
CCH Lab. Cas. 9 32,904 (S.D. Tex. 1973), appeal docketed, No. 74-1485, 5th Cir., Feb. 22,
1 74  -
294 See cases cited in note 293 supra.
299
 Hodgson v. Newport Indus. Prod. Co., 20 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 688, 692, 68
CCH Lab. Cas. 11 32,712 (E.D. Tenn. 1972).
296
 475 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1973).
48
THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963
receive a wage increase immediately. 297 The Fifth Circuit, there-
fore, appears to have based its conclusion on two of the three tests it
enumerated in the Brookhaven General Hospital decision: (1) the
increased responsibility was not substantially greater; and (2) the
added responsibility did not have a value commensurate with the
differential. 298
One theory which has been advanced in certain cases is that the
obligation to care for the safety of others in the performance of
duties is a "responsibility" within the meaning of the EPA. In
Hodgson v. Square D. Co., 299
 the employer argued that the use of
an electrical cart by the males in transporting stock and equipment
was an added responsibility in that care had to be exercised for the
safety of others. The district court decision, which was upheld by
the Sixth Circuit, indicated that this defense was "largely contrived"
and not of a type associated with differences in wage levels. 300 A
similar position was adopted in the Daisy Manufacturing case, 301
where the court held that the males' obligation to exercise care for
others in rolling containers of parts did not confer on the men an
added "responsibility." The court noted that the record was devoid
of any accidents resulting from such material handling and that, in
any event, this duty was and is not within the equal pay concept of
job responsibility. 302
XI. SIMILAR WORKING CONDITIONS
Employees engaged in jobs requiring equal skill, effort and
responsibility are likely to be performing them under similar work-
ing conditions. However, the equal pay principle does not apply in a
comparison of employees who perform otherwise equal jobs under
dissimilar working conditions. 3 °3
The statutory phrase "working conditions" was intended by
Congress as a term of industrial art, 304 best defined by reference to
the job classification systems from which the phrase was borrowed.
In Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 305 therefore, the Supreme
297 475 F.2d at 1051.
29° Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 725 (5th Cir. 1970).
299 19 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 752, 64 CCH Lab. Cas. If 32,397 (E.D. Ky. 1970), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 459 F.2d 805 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 967 (1972).
7°° 19 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. at 754, specifically approved, 459 F.2d at 807-08.
3°1 Hodgson v. Daisy Mfg. Co., 317 F. Supp. 538 (W.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 823
(8th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
302 317 F. Supp. at 544.
303 29 C.F.R.	 800.132 (1973).
3°4 H.R. Rep. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1963), reprinted in Staff of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Legislative History of the Equal Pay
Act of 1963, 44 (Comm. Print 1963). [hereinafter cited as Legislative History).
3 ° 7 94 S. Ct. 2223 (1974).
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Court construed the term as encompassing the physical surround-
ings and hazards of a job. The following factors constitute the
physical surroundings and hazards of a job: "inside work v. outside
work, exposure to heat, cold, wetness, humidity, noise, vibration,
hazards (risk of bodily injury), fumes, odors, toxic conditions, dust
and poor ventilation."306
The EPA defines equal work as "equal work on jobs the per-
formance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility,
and which are performed under similar working conditions . . . ." 3"
Significantly, the EPA does not require that "working conditions" be
"equal," but only that they be "similar." Undoubtedly, therefore,
the word "similar" denotes a more flexible test than is available in
measuring the other criteria of the equal pay standard. This is
especially evident from the fact that at least one of the many
proposed equal pay bills before Congress in 1963 would have re-
quired "working conditions" to be "equal." 308 Thus, the EPA's
utilization of the term "similar working conditions" indicates an
apparent intent of Congress to allow greater latitude in the compari-
son of "working conditions" than is permissible with regard to the
other elements of the equal pay standard.
In line with these conclusions, the administrative interpreta-
tions note that "slight or inconsequential differences in working
conditions that are essentially similar would not justify a differential
in pay."309
 Thus, one court held that a pay differential could not be
based on dissimilarity of working conditions where the compared
jobs were "performed in essentially the same surrounclings." 31 ° On
the other hand, if certain sales persons are engaged in selling a
product exclusively inside a store and others employed by the same
'employer spend a significant amount of time selling the same prod-
uct away from the store, the working conditions would be dissimi-
lar. 3
 
I 1
Another aspect of the "similar working conditions" requirement
has been discussed in a number of cases comparing the jobs of male
custodians and female matrons in schools. Each of these cases has
adopted the view that otherwise equal work performed merely in
3 °6 2 U.S. Dep't of Labor, Dictionary of Occupational Titles 656 (3d ed. 1965), which is
referred to by the Supreme Court in Corning, 94 S. Ct. at 2232 n.21.
3 ° 1 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1970).
3" H.R. 5605, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) (introduced by Congressman Goodell, N.Y.)
provided equal pay for equal work or jobs the performance of which requires equal skill,
effort, responsibility and working conditions."
3°9
 29 C.F.R. § 800.132 (1973) (emphasis added).
3 " Hodgson v. City Stores, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 942, 949 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd sub
nom., Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1973).
111 29 C.F.R. § 800.132 (1973).
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different areas of a school building will not constitute dissimilar
working conditions. 312 In a similar vein, the court in a factually
analogous case held:
The mere fact that jobs are in different departments of
an establishment will not necessarily mean that the jobs
are performed under dissimilar working conditions. 29
C.F.R. § 800.131. Where salespersons and division mana-
gers all work within the confines of a modern retail store,
they are working under "similar working conditions" for
purposes of the Act even though they work in different
departments of the store. 313
A number of hospital cases have also dealt with allegations of
dissimilar working conditions. In Hodgson v. Brookhaven General
Hospital, 314 for instance, the Fifth Circuit stated: "where pay is
unequal, no dissimilarity in working conditions is relevant unless it
somehow explains the pay differential. " 315 In that case, there was
evidence that work on North Station was more unpleasant than
work on South. However, there was no evidence that orderlies or
aides assigned to North Station were regularly paid more than their
counterparts of the same sex on South. The court therefore found
that there was no rational economic justification for treating the
working conditions as being dissimilar, since employees of both
sexes received the same respective rates regardless of whether they
worked on North Station or South Station. 36
This conclusion appears quite logical. A practical judgment is
required for each separate case, and the evaluation must be made in
the light of whether alleged differences in working conditions are of
the kind customarily taken into consideration in setting wage
levels. 317
 If the employer made no distinction with respect to pay-
ment of wages for the alleged dissimilarity, then it would appear
that the working conditions are "similar" for purposes of the EPA.
The test is one of economic reality. Those working in the allegedly
unpleasant, onerous or difficult conditions may receive a wage rate
commensurately higher than their counterparts of the same sex who
" 2 See, e.g., Hodgson v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 21 BNA Wage & Hour Cas.
123, 127, 71 CCH Lab. Cas. 11 32,920 (S.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd mem. No. 72-2805, 9th Cir.,
Sept. 5, 1974. Brennan v, Board of Educ.—BNA Wage & Hour Cas.—,74 CCH Lab. Cas.
11 — (D.N.J. 1974).
In Hodgson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 20 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 611, 615, 68 CCH
Lab. Cas. ¶ 32,684 (W.D, Ky. 1972),
314 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970).
315 Id. at 723 n.3.
are
317 29 C.F.R.	 800.131 (1973),
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do not work under such conditions. Failure to make such increased
payments is evidence that the working conditions were not consid-
ered by the employer as the basis for the wage disparity. 318
XII. THE Corning DECISION
As was noted in the Introduction to this article, on June 3, 1974
the Supreme Court handed down a 5-3 decision in Corning Glass
Works v. Brennan," the first EPA case to be heard by the high
court. The principal question posed in the case was "whether Corn-
ing Glass Works violated the [EPA] by paying a higher base wage to
male night shift inspectors than it paid to female inspectors perform-
ing the same tasks on the day shift, where the higher wage was paid
in addition to a separate night shift differential paid to all employees
for night work."32° In resolving an "unusually direct conflict be-
tween two circuits" on the question, 32 ' the Court centered on the
meaning of the term "similar working conditions." Due to subsidiary
issues and the very nature of any ground-breaking decision, the
force of Corning will necessarily affect all aspects of EPA enforce-
ment.
The Facts
Leading up to the Corning decision were two separate suits for
injunctions filed by, the Secretary of Labor against the Corning,
New York, and Wellsboro, Pennsylvania plants of this major glass
products manufacturer. 322
 The facts in both cases are strikingly
similar. 323
319
 Another example of dissimilar working conditions justifying an actual differential is
to be found in another hospital case, Hodgson v. Good Shepherd Hosp,, 327 F. Supp. 143
(E.D. Tex. 1971):
The [male] orderly by virtue of working all over the hospital, and the demand-
ing working conditions in the emergency room, performed his duties in a different
environment—more taxing and demanding work encompassing the unpleasant con-
tact with the very ill, severely injured and dying, the unruly and violent, the drunk
and drug addict—all this points up the hard, heavy, unpleasant, tedious and
dangerous work of the orderly—which rarely at any time confronted the [female]
aide. The constant strain and tension of hospital wide responsibility to emergency
calls was a factor in the more onerous and hazardous working conditions to which
orderlies were subjected.
Id. at 148.
319 (94 S. Ct. 2223 1974). The majority opinion was written by Justice Marshall, in
which Justices Douglas, Brennan, White and Powell joined. Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Blackmun and Rehnquist dissented. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case. Id.
32° 'Id. at 2226.
321 Id. at 2226, aff'g Hodgson v. Corning Glass Works, 474 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1973), and
rev'g Brennan v. Corning Glass Works, 480 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1973).
322 A third suit, alleging similar violations, was filed against a Corning plant in Central
Falls, Rhode Island, Disposition of that case was postponed pending the outcome of the other
two suits. See Brennan v. Corning Glass Works, Civil No. 4036 (D.R.I. filed Nov. 22, 1968).
323 Unless otherwise indicated, all facts are summarized from the Supreme Court opinion
94 S. Ct. 2223.
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The practice of compensating male inspectors at higher base
rates began during the period 1925 to 1930, when Corning started
automating its plants. Prior to 1925, almost without exception it was
women who were assigned to inspection classifications at the plants
in dispute. The advent of automation made it desirable to institute a
night shift and staff it with inspectors, but New York and Pennsyl-
vania state laws prohibited the employment of women during
night-time hours. Consequently, only men could be employed as
inspectors on the third shift. The men who transferred into the
inspection jobs demanded and received wages which were compa-
rable to the rates which they had previously received on other, often
more demanding, jobs in the plant. These rates were approximately
twice the wages paid to female inspectors who worked on the day
shifts.
During the period of the transfer and for many years thereafter,
Corning paid no shift differentials. It was not until 1944, when the
Corning plants were unionized, that a collective bargaining agree-
ment was negotiated which contained a shift differential provision.
This contract did not eliminate the higher base wage rate paid to
male night shift inspectors; rather, the new shift differential ac-
corded to the night shift inspectors was superimposed on the existing
difference in base rates.
Following the effective date of the EPA, Corning eliminated its
practice of maintaining separate wage schedules for male and female
employees and merged the two schedules. This merger, however,
preserved the wage.disparity between day and night shift inspectors
by placing the women in lower labor grades calling for lower rates
of pay. During 1966, but long after the relaxation of restrictions in
both New York and Pennsylvania, 324 women were permitted for the
first time to bid into night shift inspector positions. 325 The facts
establish that a significant number of women availed themselves of
this opportunity. Those women who transferred to the night shift
received the shift differential, plus the higher base wage. Neverthe-
less, those women who continued to work on the day shift together
with men who transferred to the day shift, received the lower base
rate.
The final change instituted by Corning took place through a
collective bargaining agreement which became effective on January
20, 1969. As of that date, the separate base wage rates for day and
324 The Pennsylvania law was amended in 1947 and the New York law was amended in
1953. Id. at 2227 n.7.
325
 A temporary exception was made during World War II when manpower shortages
caused Corning to be permitted to employ women on the night shift inspection jobs, for which
they were paid the same higher night shift wages earned by the men. Id. at 2227 n.4.
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night shifts were abolished and a uniform base rate for all shifts was
adopted. This new rate was higher than the base rate which had
been paid to night shift inspectors. At the same time, however, the
employer, through retroactive wage increases, agreed to pay a
higher rate to night shift inspectors who were employed on or before
January 20, 1969. 326
As of January 20, 1969, the day shift inspectors would receive
an added raise to the new uniform rate. In contrast, however, the
night shift inspectors who were employed on or before the effective
date of the new uniform rate would be permitted to retain the higher
rate under an alleged "red circle" theory. 327 This "red circle" rate,
therefore, continued a wage disparity between day and night shift
inspectors even beyond January 20, 1969.
The issues
Corning's basic defense to the suits was the argument that the
equal pay standard did not apply to the situation, inasmuch as the
different shifts worked by the men and women constituted a dissimi-
lar "working condition" within the meaning of the EPA. Alterna-
tively, it was Corning's contention that even if a violation were
proven, it was corrected in 1966 when the night shift jobs were
opened to the women. Finally, .it was alleged that any remaining
violation was cured in 1969, when the base wage rates for the
various shifts were equalized.
The position of the Secretary of Labor was that time-of-day-
worked did not constitute a dissimilar "working condition," and,
thus, the Secretary contended that the equal pay standard did
apply. The Department of Labor did not question Corning's right to
pay higher wages, in the form of a shift differential, to employees
working undesirable hours. In fact, the administrative interpreta-
tions explicitly recognize the legitimacy of such a practice. 328 What
the Department did challenge was Corning's right to maintain a
wage differential, in favor of the male night shift employees, which
was paid over and above the shift differential. The Department
326
 Abstracted from the Brief for the Secretary of Labor at 14-15 n.10, Corning Glass
Works v. Brennan, 94 S. Ct. 2223 (1974).
327
 The term "red circle" rates describes certain unusual, higher than normal, wage
rates which are maintained for many reasons .... Under the "red circle" principle
the employer may continue to pay the male employee his present salary, which is
greater than that paid to the women employees, for the work both will be doing . .
However, where wage rate differentials have been or are being paid on the basis of
sex to employees performing equal work, rates of the higher paid employees may not
be "red circled" in order to comply with the [EPA].
29 C.F.R. § 800.146 (1973).
328
 As noted by the Supreme Court, 29 C.F.R. § 800.145 (1973) "recognizes the legiti-
macy of night shift differentials shown to be a factor other than sex." 94 S. Ct. at 2233 n.25.
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takes the position that shift differentials may be justified as based on
"factors other than sex." Nevertheless, in this case it was argued
that the difference in the base wage rates did not rest on "factors
other than sex," but on sex itself. The Department also contended
that the violation was not cured in 1966 by allowing some women to
earn the higher rate, while permitting others to continue performing
equal work on the day shifts without receiving the higher base wage
rate. Lastly, it was argued that the violation was not corrected in
1969 by the equalization of wage rates, since the higher so-called
"red-circle" rate only served to perpetuate the sex-based differential.
Divergent dispositions in the Second and Third Circuits
The district court in New York agreed with the Secretary and
found violations. 329 The court looked to two job evaluation plans
utilized by Corning in setting wage rates, both of which plans
measured working conditions. Neither plan, however, in measuring
working conditions, took into account the time of day a particular
job was performed. Consequently, the district court rejected
Corning's contentions based on dissimilarity of working conditions
and found the compared jobs to be equal. 33 ° The Second Circuit
affirmed the lower court holding that differences in shift do not
constitute dissimilar working conditions."' In support of its deci-
sion, the appellate court cited the legislative history of the equal pay
standard. The court noted that certain of the proposed bills con-
tained language which would have only required "equal work on
jobs the performance of which requires equal skills."332 Neverthe-
less, through the urging of industry representatives, and notably
Corning's own Director of Industrial Relations Research, the Con-
gress was persuaded to adopt a standard patterned after job evalua-
tion systems used in industry. These industrial plans evaluated jobs
in terms of skill, effOrt, responsibility and working conditions.
As an example of such plans, Corning's own plan was entered
into the record at the legislative hearings. 333 In the Corning plan
which was introduced, the "working condition" criterion was mea-
sured in terms of "surroundings" and "hazards." 334
 "Surroundings"
required considerations of such factors as exposure to elements, and
329 Shultz v, Corning Glass Works, 319 F. Supp. 1161 (W.D. N.Y. 1970).
339
 Id. at 1166-70.
"l Hodgson v. Corning Glass Works, 474 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1973).
332
 Id. at 231.
333 See Hearings on H.R. 3861 and Related Bills Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor
of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 232-240 (1963); Hearings
on S. 882 and S. 910 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Public Welfare, 88th Cong,, 1st Sess. 96-104 (1963).
334 See 94 S. Ct, at 2232; 474 F,2d at 231.
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the intensity and frequency of such exposure. "Hazards" required
consideration of such facts as frequency of exposure to hazard,
frequency of injury and seriousness of injury. No mention was
made, under "working conditions," of time-of-day-worked or differ-
ences in shift. Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that Congress, in
adopting the working condition criterion, was adopting industry's
own criterion which did not consider shift differences to be dissimi-
lar "working conditions."335
The Second Circuit also referred to the House Committee re-
port in support of its position that differences in shift did not fall
within the "working conditions" criterion. 336 That report appears to
indicate that different wage rates based on time-of-day-worked may
fall within the "factor other than sex" exception to the equal pay
standard. The court, therefore, considered whether the different
base rates were properly predicated on "factors other than sex," and
held that the rates were not within the statutory exception: 337
As the history set out above indicates, the higher night rate
was in large part the product of the generally higher wage
level of male workers and the need to compensate them for
performing what were regarded as demeaning tasks.- The
wage differential has never been regarded as compensation
for night work. There was no evidence that any other
night employees received higher pay than corresponding
day workers until the plantwide night differential was
superimposed on the basic rates in 1944; since that time, it
is apparent that the shift differential has been thought to
compensate, fairly and adequately, employees other than
inspectors for night work. Indeed, Corning had separate
male and female salary schedules until June 11, 1964.
The plain fact is that the differentials here at issue
arose because men would not work at the low rates paid
the women day-time inspectors to perform what the men
called "female work." This is the very condition at which
the Equal Pay Act was aimed. A higher rate paid to men
for performing low-paid "female work" is not transformed
into a permissible "differential based on any other factor
other than sex" simply because the men work at night. . . . 338
The Third Circuit, however, faced with identical arguments
"5 474 F.2d at 231-32.
336 Id. at 232, quoting from H.R. Rep. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 8 (1963),
reprinted in Legislative History, supra note 304, at 44, 49.
337 474 F.2d at 233.
"a Id.
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and having the opinion of the Second Circuit before it, nonetheless
concluded that differences in time-of-day-worked constitute dissimi-
lar working conditions within the meaning of the EPA. 339 In es-
sence, this holding was based on the unequivocal statement of a
leading proponent of the EPA bills that "hours of work, differences
in shift all would logically fall within the working condition
factor."340
 The Third Circuit therefore affirmed the district court
judgment for Corning, 34 ' which had held: "Working at night is so
significant a factor that the totality of the working conditions here
were dissimilar; they were not 'very much alike' or 'alike in sub-
stance or essentials.' Hence, plaintiff [Secretary of Labor] has failed
to prove a violation of [the EPA]." 342
Supreme Court resolution of the conflict
The Supreme Court, however, resolved the conflict between the
circuits by holding that time-of-day-worked was not a "working
condition" within the meaning of the EPA. 343 In doing so, the
majority noted "substantial agreement with the analysis of the Sec-
ond Circuit,"344 while the minority dissented "for the reasons
stated" in the Third Circuit opinion. 345
The approach taken to the burden of proof problem by the
Court came as no surprise. Citing, more than a dozen circuit and
district court cases, the Court held that "once the Secretary has
carried his burden of showing that the employer pays workers of one
sex more than workers of the opposite sex for equal work, the
burden shifts to the employer to show that the differential is justified
under one of the Act's four exceptions based on factors other than
sex."346 Nothing more need be shown by an EPA plaintiff. Neither
the Secretary nor an individual employee is required to show that
the differential was the result of "sex discrimination" per se. In-
stead, once the differential is shown to exist between the sexes
treated as classes, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate
that the differential is not the result of even unintended discrimina-
tion.
In disposing of the "working conditions" issue the Court was
faced with conflicting prior statutory constructions. The Third Cir-
339
 Brennan v. Corning
3" Id. at 1260, quoting
Goodell, N,Y.).
341 474 F.2d at 1261.
342 Hodgson v. Corning
343 94 S. Ct. at 2232.
344 Id
Glass Works, 480 F.2d 1254, 1261 (3d Cir. 1973).
from 109 Cong, Rec. 9207 (1963) (remarks of Congressman
Glass Works, 341 F. Supp. 18, 21 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
343 Id. at 2236 (dissenting opinion),
346 Id. at 2229.
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cuit had relied heavily on statements in the congressional debates by
certain proponents of the equal pay standard whose views on the
proper construction of the EPA sharply contrasted with the commit-
tee reports accompanying the legislation, which reports were treated
as controlling by the Second Circuit in its decision. 347 In resolving
the conflict, the Court made no attempt "to reconcile or establish
preferences between the conflicting interpretations of the Act by
individual legislators or the committee reports." 348 Instead, the
court held that a better understanding of the term "working condi-
tions" could be obtained by considering the manner in which Con-
gress arrived at the actual statutory language. Thus, it was con-
• cluded in Corning that Congress intended "to incorporate into the
[EPA] the well-defined and well-accepted principles of job evalua-
tion . .. ."349
 Therefore, the statutory term was held to encompass
only physical surroundings and hazards, not time-of-day-worked.
This interpretation agreed with the job classifications systems and
job evaluations which Corning's own representatives had urged
Congress to accept. The Court found it significant that those plans
submitted by Corning in 1963 had omitted time-of-day-worked as a
factor to be considered under working conditions in setting wage
rates."'
While a layman might well assume that time of day
worked reflects one aspect of a job's "working conditions,"
the term has a different and much more specific meaning
in the language of industrial relations . . . The fact of the
matter is that the concept of "working conditions," as used
in the specialized language of job evaluation systems, sim-
ply does not encompass shift differentials. 3 "
Nonetheless, the Court did agree with Corning and the Third
Circuit to the extent that it found night work to entail certain
psychological and physiological impacts, which would make the
work less attractive than that performed during the rest of the day.
The Court held, however, that such matters were not part of an
EPA plaintiff's burden of proof. Rather, the mental and physical
impact of night shift work was held to be an affirmative defense
available to the employer, on a clear showing that the resulting
wage differential was based on a non-discriminatory factor other
See id. at 2229-30.
343
 Id. at 2230.
349 Id. at 2231.
3" Id. at 2232.
351
 Id. at 2231-32.
58
THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963
than sex. 352 Corning, of course, was unable to make the showing,
since the original wage differential had been based on sex.
The Court next examined Corning's contention that if there
were a violation as of the 1964 effective date of the EPA, it had
been cured either in 1966 by the opening up of the night shift to
women inspectors, or on January 20, 1969 by setting a uniform base
rate for all inspectors except those incumbent employees who work
on the night shift who were "red circled" at a higher rate. As to the
effect of opening up the night shift jobs to women, the Court held:
If, as the Secretary proved, the work performed by women
on the day shift was equal to that performed by men on the
night shift, the company became obligated to pay the
women the same base wage as their male counterparts on
the effective date of the Act. To permit the company to
escape that obligation by agreeing to allow some women to
work on the night shift at a higher rate of pay as vacancies
occurred would frustrate, not serve, Congress' ends. 353
This comment is especially interesting in view of its recognition
of the plight of the women. For while Corning had in 1966 permit-
ted women to bid for the night shift, with its higher-base wage,
women were not allowed to exercise their seniority to "bump" a less
senior male night inspector. Thus the inescapable fact was that, of
the people on the night shift when that higher wage was "red
circled" in 1969 and a new uniform rate was set for all other
inspectors, the vast majority of those "red circled" were men while
the vast majority of lower paid inspectors were women. Therefore,
the thrust of the Court's ruling is that employers, when confronted
with a situation wherein jobs are found to be equal, cannot cure
prior violations of the EPA merely by permitting women to transfer
into the higher-paid jobs. The EPA explicitly provides that an
employer may not, in order to achieve compliance, "reduce the wage
rate of any employee." 354 The clear purpose of this proviso is to
require the offending employer to equalize the wage rates by raising
the wage paid members of the lower-paid sex to the level of the
higher-paid sex, thereby eliminating any need for "transfer."
As for the 1969 equalization and "red circle" plan, the Court
found that it too failed to satisfy the EPA requirements:
[I]t is clear from the record that had the company
352
 Id. at 2232-33.
353
 Id. at 2234-35.
354
 29 U.S.C. § 206(01) (1970.
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equalized the base wage rates of male and female inspec-
tors on the effective date of the Act, as the law required,
the day inspectors in 1969 would have been entitled to the
same higher "red circle" rate the company provided for
night inspectors. 355
The Court thus made clear that no employer, in correcting an EPA
violation, may "red circle" a discriminatory higher wage rate previ-
ously paid to members of one sex and then set a separate, lower
schedule for the previous discriminatees. For, as the Supreme Court
noted with regard to Corning's alleged "red circle" policy:
[Tjhe company's continued discrimination in base wages
between night and day workers, though phrased in terms
of a neutral factor other than sex, nevertheless operated to
perpetuate the effects of the company's prior illegal prac-
tice of paying women less than men for equal work. 356
XIII. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
The EPA provides that an employer will not be in violation of
the equal pay standard if an existing wage differential between male
and female employees was instituted "pursuant to (i) a seniority
system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by
quantity or quality of production; or (iv) .. . any other factor other
than sex . ."357 Thus, there are three specific and one broad
general exception to the standard requiring that male and female
employees doing equal work be paid equal wages. These exceptions
recognize, as do the reports of the legislative committees, that cer-
tain systems and factors other than sex can be used to justify a wage
differential, even where the compared employees are performing
equal work. 358
The sundry interpretive difficulties which arise from the lan-
guage of these exceptions have been the subject of much litigation.
Not only have the courts been faced with the task of determining
the parameters of the so-called general exception, "any other factor
other than sex,"359
 but they have also had to determine what would
or would not fall within the specific exceptions. 369 Moreover, the
355 94 S. Ct. at 2235.
356 Id.
357 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1970).
33 ti H.R. Rep. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1963), reprinted in Staff of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 88th Cong.,lst Sess., Legislative History of the Equal Pay
Act of 1963, 44 (Comm. Print 1963) [hereinafter cited as Legislative History]; S. Rep. No.
176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1963), reprinted in Legislative History, supra, at 39.
339 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(iv) (1970).
3" See, e.g., Hodgson v. Golden Isles Nursing Home, Inc., 19 BNA Wage & Hour Cas.
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phraseology of these exceptions gives rise to an added problem of
construction, namely the relationship between these exceptions. The
problem is whether the four exceptions are wholly independent of
each other, or whether the first three are merely illustrative of the
fourth. Understandably, it would have been extremely difficult—if
not impossible—to conceive of all the possible circumstances war-
ranting an exception from the equal pay standard. It appears,
therefore, that the intention was to describe three specific examples
for the purpose of clarity and then to cover all other contingencies
by the inclusion of the broad general exception. 36 ' In fact, the
wording of the provision supports such a construction, the choice of
the phrase "any other factor" being an indication that the systems
which precede it are merely examples of factors other than sex.
Unlike the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 362 the EPA does not
explicitly require that these systems be "bona fide" or that they not
be instituted with an intention to discriminate. As one commentator
has said:
However, it is implicit in the Act especially with its express
intention to eliminate sex discrimination, that the seniority
system, merit system, or system rewarding quantity and
quality of production must be bona fide and not a device
for evading the Act. Any other conclusion would violate
the cardinal rules of statutory construction—that a reme-
dial statute must be liberally construed and given a mean-
ing which effectuates its purpose. 363
Thus, the House . Report which accompanied the EPA specifically
states that a valid defense would consist of a "bona fide" program
which "does not discriminate on the basis of sex." 364 Similarly, the
Chairman of the Senate Labor Subcommittee which considered the
EPA stressed that any employer plan or system "must be a bona fide
one" in order to qualify for an exception. 365
To come within the purview of the exempting provisions, there-
fore, any system or factor of the type described must be uniformly
and consistently applied irrespective of sex.
903, 64 CCH Lab. Cas. 32,445 (S.D. Fla. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Hodgson v: Golden Isles
Convalescent Homes, Inc., 468 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
361 "Three specific exceptions and one broad general exception are also listed . . As it
is impossible to list each and every exception, the broad general exclusion has also been
included." H.R. Rep. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1963), reprinted in Legislative
History, supra note 358, at 44.
362 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (Supp. II 1972).
363 Berger, Equal Pay, Equal Employment Opportunity and Equal Enforcement of the
Law for Women, 5 Val. U. L. Rev. 326, 347 (1971).
3" H.R. Rep. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1963), reprinted in Legislative History,
supra note 363, at 44.
36s
	 Cong. Rec. 9761 (1963) (remarks of Senator McNamara, Mich.).
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A sex based system or a system in which sex plays any part
cannot be considered as a proper defense under the Equal
Pay Act. Otherwise, employers could escape the impact of
the Act by establishing a "seniority system" providing dif-
ferent seniority lines for men and women, a "merit system"
that applied differently to men and women, or "a system
measuring earnings by quantity or quality of production"
which set different standards for men and women. 366
In order to justify a wage differential based on a system or
factor other than sex, there must, moreover, be a reasonable rela-
tionship between the amount of the differential and the weight
properly attributable to the system or factor. 367 For instance, if male
employees work a greater number of hours per week than their
female counterparts and are paid weekly salaries for such work, a
differential in the amount of pay could be justified as based on the
number of hours worked. However, if the difference in salaries is
too great to be accounted for by the difference in hours of work,
then such a factor could not serve as the sole 'basis for the wage
differential. In other words, if some portion of the differential can-
not be reasonably justified on the basis of the additional hours
worked, it would be incumbent on the employer "to show some
other factor other than sex as the basis for the unexplained portion
of the wage differential before a conclusion that there is no wage
discrimination based on sex would be warranted."'"
The first exceptions to be considered are those systems which
are specifically designated in the EPA. Wage-rate differentials pred-
icated on bona fide seniority systems, merit systems, or systems
which measure earnings by the quantity or quality of production
—when applied equally to employees of both sexes—do not violate
the equal pay standard. The Department of Labor has taken the
position that exceptions for such "systems" are not restricted solely
to formal or written systems and plans. Rather, any system or plan
311
 Berger, supra note 363, at 347 (emphasis added). "The requirements for such an
exception are not met unless the factor of sex provides no part of the basis for the wage
differential." 29 C.F.R. § 800.142 (1973). See, e.g., Hodgson v. Washington Hosp., 19 BNA
Wage & Hour Cris. 1101, 65 CCH Lab. Cas. 11 32,499 (W.D. Pa. 1971). "Inadvertent as it
may have been, defendant did not apply the provisions of its merit-seniority system 'with]
uniformity to male and female Technicians . . [S]uch nonuniform application of a
merit-seniority system leads to a conclusion that such systems will not bring an employer
within the exceptions contained in [the EPA]." 19 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. at 1105.
367
 29 C.F.R. § 800.143 (1973).
318
	 In Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 414 U.S.
822 (1973), the employer attempted to justify a wage disparity in favor of a male data
processing department supervisor on the basis, inter alio, that, in addition to his management
duties, he worked several hours on Saturday mornings taking orders and delivering merchan-
dise. The court held, however, that the extra weekend duties were insufficient to justify the
wage differential in question. 475 F.2d at 1050.
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may qualify, as long as "it can be demonstrated that the standards
or criteria applied under it are applied pursuant to an established
plan the essential terms and conditions of which have been com-
municated to the affected employees."369
Accordingly, one court rejected a claimed "merit system" excep-
tion on the ground, inter alia, that the system had never been
communicated to the employees. 370 It is also noteworthy that, al-
though the system was found to have "general guidelines," the court
ruled that "specific criteria" were required for determining on what
step of a salary range an employee should be placed. 371 Thus, "the
subjective evaluations of the employer cannot stand alone as a basis
for salary discrimination based on sex."'" Much more is required;
however, exactly how much more is an open question.
An indication of the requirements may be gleaned from the
Golden Isles case. 373
 In a decision affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, the
district court permitted a "merit system" exception with the follow-
ing characteristics:
Pay raises were not automatic, only the evaluation was
automatic. Under the merit system, performance entitled
an individual to a raise. Such evaluations were uniform
and regular, i.e., every three months. . . Pay raises under
this merit system use the following criteria: performance,
reliability, initiative, responsibilities and fulfillment of re-
sponsibilities both to the patient and to the nursing
home. 374
Another district court decision affirmed by the Fifth Circuit held a
merit system to be valid where it was shown that "the officers and
directors of the bank held quarterly meetings for the purpose of
evaluating the service of the various employees," in terms of their
individual competence, interest and value to the institution. 375
369
 29 C.F.R. § 800.144 (1973).
3" Brennan v. Goose Creek Canso!. lndep. School Dist., 21 BNA Wage & Hour Cas.
25, 27, 71 CCH Lab. Cas. 11 32,904 (S.D. Tex. 1973), appeal docketed, No. 74-1485, 5th Cir.,
Feb. 22, 1974.
3" 21 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. at 27. The court also noted that the "merit" raises
"consistently failed to be applied in connection with the female employees so as to raise the
majority of the female employees above what the evidence reflected to be the general
beginning rate." Id.
372
 Brennan v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896, 902 (5th Cir. 1974).
373
 Hodgson v. Golden Isles Nursing Home, Inc., 19 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 903, 64
CCH Lab. Cas. 32,445 (S.D. Fla. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Hodgson v. Golden Isles Convales-
cent Homes, Inc., 468 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
374
 19 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. at 905.
375
 Wirtz v. First Victoria Nat'l Bank, 19 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 684, 687, 63 CCH
Lab. Cas. ¶ 32,378 (S.D. Tex, 1970), aff'd sub nom. Hodgson v. First Victoria Nat'l Bank,
446 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1971).
63
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Whatever the requirements, once it is shown that the criteria
for merit increases implement an established plan and are applied
irrespective of sex, such a merit system is a valid defense to the
wage disparities which it creates. A similar, if less complex, situa-
tion is encountered where an employer pays employees in accor-
dance with a wage scale which consists of a series of "step" in-
creases, each step representing one unit of time-in-service, i.e.,
seniority. 376
 Such a seniority system, if applied equally and consis-
tently to males and females performing equal work, constitutes a
non-discriminatory exception to the equal pay standard. In either
case, of course, it is evident that the mere labeling of certain wage
increases as being attributable to one of the excepted "systems" does
not thereby constitute a valid defense. 377
In any event, the bona fide character of this type of merit or
seniority system is not affected by the existence of a discriminatory
starting or hiring wage. On the other hand, a valid merit or senior-
ity system does not act to relieve the initial discrimination; rather, it
merely perpetuates the discrimination. As the Fifth Circuit com-
mented in Brennan v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co.: 378 "The
significance of the initial salary of an employee is of the utmost
importance because in the case of a person starting at a lower salary
it would be extremely difficult for the lower paid person ever to
catch up . . . ."379
Where the initial salary does result in an EPA violation (e.g.,'
the employer consistently hires women at a lower starting rate), the
employer will not be protected by the fact that "some women, after
long periods of service, ultimately reached higher salary levels than
men subsequently hired." 38° Likewise, a violation may not be
avoided "through the selection of a few women for favorable treat-
ment or a few men for unfavorable treatment—the result of which
376
 See, e.g., Kilpatrick v. Sweet, 262 F. Supp. 561, 564 (M.D. Fla. 1967) (de facto
seniority system).
377
 Hodgson v. Maison Miramon, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 843, 849 (F.D. La. 1972). The
employer asserted that pay differentials were based upon seniority systems, merit promotions,
and a system measuring earnings by quantity and quality of work production. Instead, the
court found that "[al promotions given the [female] aides were to comply with minimum
wage requirements; and all promotions given to [male] orderlies were merely attempts to keep
the services of the orderlies by maintaining their wages above those wages paid the aides." Id.
378
 493 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974).
379
 Id. at 902 (emphasis in original). It is to be noted that, for purposes of calculating the
amount of the initial wage differential, the court used the salary of a male employee who
"remained with the Bank but one month." Id. The court found that "he is the proper male
standard for comparison in relation to the beginning employees in his group," inasmuch as he
"was hired by the defendant with the full expectation that he would become a full-time
employee." Id.
3" Hodgson v. American Bank of Commerce, 447 F.2d 416, 421 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'g in
part and rev'g in part, Wirtz v. American Bank of Commerce, 19 BNA Wage & Hour Cas.
774, 777, 64 CCH Lab. Cas. 32,400 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
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would be to give protective coloration to a generally discriminatory
pattern.""I
Generally, "[i]n a case of wage discrimination between the sexes
the last rate which an employer pays to each male employee is
thereby established as the minimum rate which the defendant is
legally obligated to pay women performing substantially the same
job under similar working conditions." 382 The requirement is neces-
sarily somewhat different where bona fide merit and/or seniority
systems are applicable and the violation is restricted solely to the
initial rate or salary. In such cases, of course, the starting/hiring
rates of the affected employees would have to be retroactively ad-
justed to the rates they would have received had they not been the
objects of sexual discrimination. 383 Once that adjustment is made, a
divergence occurs between the situations where a merit system and
a seniority system are involved. With regard to a merit system, the
members of the lower-paid sex would each add on to their own
adjusted hiring rate all personal merit increases actually received,
without reference to the merit in raises received by other employees.
With regard to a seniority system, the members of the lower-paid
sex would be raised to the pay schedule of the higher-paid sex and
placed on the "step" of that higher schedule to which their own
seniority entitles them.
In determining the validity of a starting or hiring rate differen-
tial, it is accepted that a court may evaluate an employee's educa-
tion and prior work experience, at least to the extent these and
similar factors are wholly unrelated to sex 384 and are relevant to the
jobs in question. 385
 Thus, in Golden Isles, the district court deter-
mined not only that the wage increases were within the merit system
exception, but also that the base rates were non-discriminatory since
they were predicated on educational qualifications, prior experience
and training and personal interviews. 386 However, even where such
factors other than sex are relevant to the jobs in question, the
factors must also be applied uniformly and consistently to employees
of both sexes. In Brookhaven General Hospital, "7
 for instance, the
district court found that newly-hired male orderlies received the
381 447 F.2d at 421.
382 Hodgson v. Industrial Bank, 347 F. Supp. 63, 68 (S.D. Ga. 1972). See also Wirtz v,
Meade Mfg., Inc., 285 F. Supp, 812, 814 (D. Kan. 1968).
383 Shultz v. Saxonburg Ceramics, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 1139, 1146 (W.D. Pa. 1970). See
also Hodgson v. Industrial Bank, 347 F. Supp. at 68.
384 Brennan v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896, 902 (5th Cir, 1974).
381 Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 1970).
386
 Hodgson v. Golden Isles Nursing Home, Inc., 19 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 903,
905.06, 64 CCH Lab. Cas. 9 32,445 (S.D. Fla. 1971), aff'd sub nom., Hodgson v. Golden
Isles Convalescent Homes, Inc., 468 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
387 Shultz v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 305 F. Supp. 424 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
65
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
same wages whether or not they had any college education, while
female aides with some college education were hired at lower wages
than orderlies with similar education. 388
 Therefore, due to such
inconsistencies, the factor of college education could not serve to
justify disparities in hiring rates in that case.
One "factor other than sex" which has been clearly recognized
is the so-called "shift differential." The administrative interpreta-
tions state:
[wihen applied without distinction to employees of both
sexes, shift differentials . . . will not result in equal pay
violations. For example, in an establishment where men
and women are employed on a job, but only men work on
the night shift for which a night shift differential is paid,
such a differential would not be prohibited. 389
In the Miller Brewing 39 ° case, however, the Seventh Circuit found
that the employer's claim that the entire wage disparity was based
on differences in shifts worked "was not well taken because even
when the men worked the day shift they were still paid the differen-
tial and the 70 cents more at night was in addition to the shift
differential of 10 to 16 cents an hour." 3"
The "factor other than sex" exception was also extensively
discussed in Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc. 392 In that case,
both the higher-paid salesmen and the lower-paid saleswomen per-
formed work which was "equal" within the meaning of the EPA.
However, only men worked in the men's department and only
women worked in the women's department. The district court noted
that such separation was a justifiable business necessity since the
jobs were not susceptible of interchangeable performance by both
sexes, due to frequent physical contact between customers and sales
personnel. Customers might be embarrassed by contact with sales-
persons of the opposite sex, resulting in possible detriment to busi-
ness. However, the district court acknowledged that an EPA viola-
tion might be found even where the assignment of salesmen only to
the men's department and saleswomen to the women's department
was a business necessity. 393
3 B 8 Id. at 426.
389
 29 C.F.R.	 800.145 (1973).
398
 Hodgson v. Miller Brewing Co., 457 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1972).
381 Id. at 225 n.8. See also Wirtz v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 265 F. Supp. 787, 790 n.1 (D.
Mass. 1967).
392 473 F.2d 589 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Brennan v. Robert HaRClothes, Inc.,
414 U.S. 866 (1973). See note, 44 Miss. L.J. 1028 (1973).
393
 326 F. Supp. at 1264, 1269 (D. Del. 1971). See Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479
F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1973), noting that "factors other than sex (customer embarrassment
primarily) justify the employer in seeking male personnel to work in conjunction with selling
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Nonetheless, the Department of Labor argued that, since the
salesmen and saleswomen performed equal work, they must receive
equal pay. In response, the employer sought to justify the wage
differential on the grounds of economic benefit, to wit the men's
department had a larger dollar volume in gross sales and a greater
gross profit. The district court in Robert Hall found that the differ-
ence in sales and profits was not attributable to the performance of
the sales personnel, but rather to the fact that merchandise sold by
the salesmen was priced higher than merchandise sold by the sales-
women. Nevertheless, the district court accepted the employer's
contention that economic benefit to the employer was a "factor other
than sex" on which a wage differential could be based. 394
On appeal, the Department of Labor asserted that the broad
exception is limited to factors which are "typically used in setting
wage scales,"395 or, "directly related to the job performance of the
individual employee—including, e.g., shift differentials, temporary
reassignments, participation in bona fide training programs, differ-
ences based on experience, training or ability, red circle rates,
etc."396 Moreover, it was argued that the "factor other than sex"
defense must be limited to factors which are not only related to job
performance, but also not sex based. 397 As the Department of Labor
emphasized, a bona fide factor cannot be available only to persons
of one sex. 395 In Robert Hall, however, women were not permitted
to work in the men's department; and, therefore, the economic
benefit factor was literally available only to males. Consequently, it
was the position of the Department of Labor that the economic
benefit factor was not a "factor other than sex" within the meaning
of the EPA.
Despite these arguments, the Third Circuit held that the
economic benefit was a valid "factor other than sex" and thus
rejected the claim of discrimination. 399
 In summation, the court
and fitting male clothing, this is no excuse for hiring saleswomen and seamstresses at lower
rates simply because the market will bear it." Id. at 241 n.12.
394 326 F. Supp. at 1272,
395 Reply Brief for Appellant, Cross-Appellee at 9, Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes,
Inc., 473 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. t973).
398 Brief for Appellant, Cross-Appellee at 21, Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 473
F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1973).
397 Id. at 20.
398
 Reply Brief for Appellant, supra note 395, Cross-Appellee at 5.
399 473 F.2d at 594. It is most interesting to note that the employer did not even strictly
adhere to the economic benefit factor in paying wages to the individual employees. Thus,
certain salesmen had a higher average hourly volume of sales than other salesmen, yet
received lower wages. Likewise, certain saleswomen had better sales records than certain
salesmen, yet the salesmen received higher wages. Accordingly, the employer did not consis-
tently apply the factor upon which he claimed to rely in setting wage rates. The Third Circuit
considered this inconsistency in Robert Hall, but held that there was no necessity to correlate
precisely the salary of each employee to the economic benefit produced by that employee, Id.
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noted: "The saleswomen are paid less because the commodities
which they sell cannot bear the same selling costs that the com-
modities sold in the men's department can bear." 4°°
Perhaps the most frequently used "factor other than sex" de-
fense is participation by the higher-paid employees of one sex in a
training program. The administrative interpretations clearly recog-
nize that a bona fide training program, if applied regardless of sex,
may serve to validate a differential which would otherwise violate
the equal pay standard. 4°I The interpretations, however, caution
against training programs which are available only to employees of
one sex and stress that such programs will "be carefully examined to
determine whether such programs are, in fact, bona fide. "402 The
Fourth Circuit appears to have taken an even stronger stand in
Hodgson v. Fairmont Supply Co., 403
 wherein it is stated: "We
cannot accept a training program coterminous with a stereotyped
province called 'man's work' as a factor other than sex. " 404
 Thus,
the court appears to rule out the possibility that any training pro-
at 597. Such a concept would appear to be contrary to the legislative intent and judicial
construction of the EPA. The position that all salesmen should be paid more and all
saleswomen should be paid less, due to the performance of the men and women as separate
classes, resurrects the very attitudes which the EPA was enacted to proscribe. See Shultz v.
Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970). Rather, as one
commentator stated: "If the employer is allowed to use economic benefit as a justification for
pay differentials, the correlation should be strictly on an individual basis and substantiated by
individual records." Note, 44 Miss. L.J. 1028, 1033 (1973).
4" 473 F.2d at 595. The Third Circuit alluded to what it believed to be an inconsistency
in the Secretary's position. The court referred to the administrative interpretations in which
commission rates are discussed. See 29 C.F.R. § 800.116(e) (1973). The example given is that
of two shoe departments within a retail store, with male and female sales personnel in each,
and higher quality, more expensive shoes sold in one department than those sold in the other
department. All sales personnel in both departments perform equal work; however, the
employer pays one commission rate to male and female sales personnel in the higher price
department and a lower commission rate to all sales personnel in the lower price department.
The administrative interpretations approve of such a situation, wherein sex plays no part in
the rates, as being within the "factor other than sex" exception. 29 C.F.R. § 800.116(e) (1973).
The Third Circuit suggested that if the Department of Labor adopts such a position
regarding commission rates, it follows that the Robert Hall disparity should be approved. 473
F.2d at 594. (It must be noted that in Robert Hall, the primary dispute was not over different
commission rates but over different base salaries.) On the contrary, however, the example
given in the administrative interpretations contemplates a situation where both men and
women work in the higher and lower paid department, and, thus, have an equal opportunity
to earn the higher commission rate. In the Robert Hall case, however, the women were not
permitted to sell the higher priced articles and, thus, did not have an equal opportunity to
earn the higher base salary. Accordingly, the Department of Labor takes the position that
even if commissions had been the basic method of payment at Robert Hall, there would still
have been a violation since women would have been denied the opportunity to earn the higher
commissions.
401 See 29 C.F.R. § 800.148 (1973).
4°' Id.
4°3 454 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1972).
404
	 at 498.
68
THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963
gram which excludes women can qualify as a "factor other than
Sex. If
In Hodgson v. Security National Bank405 a training program in
which only males were participating was considered by the Eighth
Circuit. There was testimony that the program was open to both
sexes, but there was no evidence that the management training
program had ever been offered to women. In fact, officers of the
bank indicated that even women who had college education and
prior experience were not considered for training, because of the
possibilities of pregnancy or the transfer of their husbands from the
Sioux City area The court, therefore, rejected the training program
as a justification for the higher rate and commented on the bank's
reasons for excluding women:
[Title Bank's explanation for the absence of women in the
ranks of its management trainees recites a preconceived
and traditional notion that women, because of their princi-
pal roles as wives and mothers, must occupy an employ-
ment status second to men outside the home. This notion is
outmoded as well as unfair. 406
Another of the leading cases in this area is Shultz v. First
Victoria National Bank, 407
 wherein male and female tellers were
compared. The bank attempted to justify higher wage rates paid to
the men on the basis, inter alia, of a training program in which the
males were placed. The Fifth Circuit found the alleged training
program not to be a valid "factor other than sex" for a number of
reasons. First, the essence of the program was the rotation of the
trainees from one department to another, which procedure was
dictated by personnel needs and not training requirements. Second,
there was no understanding between the bank and the male em-
ployees regarding the existence of such a program. Third, women
were excluded from the program, but nonetheless appeared to fol-
low the same course of employment as the men. 4"
In Behrens Drug, 409
 on the other hand, the employees were
informed of the sales training program's existence, although there
was no formal plan of training. Testimony established that the
trainees followed a regular system of rotation based on individual
progress, rather than personnel needs. However, once they reached
4 ° 5 460 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1972),
406
 Id. at 63.
4 °7 420 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1969).
4" Id. at 655.
409 Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 822
(1973).
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the final point in the rotation, they would not automatically become
salesmen. Instead, they had to wait until an opening occurred in
that position.'" Based on those facts, the Fifth Circuit conceded
that the training program was more concrete than that found in
First Victoria National Bank, but nonetheless found that it did not
constitute a valid "factor other than sex:"
Behrens' sales training procedure is not illusory, nor
does it constitute a mere post-event justification for dispa-
rate wage payments. Nevertheless, the program has never
included a female, and its completion—advancement to a
sales job—is entirely dependent on personnel needs. These
two program characteristics compel the conclusion that
Behrens' training procedure is not a factor other than sex
which should excuse denial of equal pay to female workers
and remove them from the aegis of the Equal Pay Act. 4 "
Yet another element which may be characterized as a factor
other than sex for purposes of an EPA exception is a "red circle
rate."412 In Hodgson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 413 the term
was defined as follows:
[A] "red circle" rate is a higher rate paid to a particular
employee when he is transferred to a job at a lower skill
and rate of pay than his former job, either on a temporary
basis, to keep him available when he is needed again in his
regular, higher paid job, or to avoid hardship when an
employee who has served long and faithfully has, by
reason of age or illness, become unable any longer to
perform his regular work. 414
In that case, however, the court found that the "changes were not at
all temporary; the higher paid men employees were not transferred
from a different job; none of them were old or ill, and none of them
exceeded in length of service with the defendant the service of most
of the lower paid women employees."415 Consequently, the court
did not allow an exception to the EPA standard. On the other hand,
an exception was allowed in a case where there was an established
"red circle" policy which "was not motivated or intended by [the
employer] to evade the Equal Pay Act, nor was it done, to correct
41D
 See Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 20 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 375, 379, 67 CCH
Lab. Cas. ¶ 32,598 (E.D. Tex. 1971).
411
	 F.2d at 1047.
4 " See 29 C.F.R. § 800.146 (1973) ,
4"
 358 F. Supp. 198 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
414 Id. at 199-200.
41 ' Id. at 200.
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any violation of the equal pay for equal work standard." 416 Thus,
where wage rate differentials have been or are being paid on the
basis of sex to employees performing equal work, rates of the
higher-paid sex may not be "red circled" in order to comply with the
EPA. To allow such a practice would be merely to perpetuate the
discrimination by freezing the status quo of prior discriminatory
practices. 417
In addition to factors which are clearly recognized as within the
statutory exceptions when applied in a bona fide manner, employers
will typically attempt to frame other potential "factors other than
sex" in the hope of thereby avoiding liability. Thus an employer will
often interpose a labor-management agreement as indicative of the
fact that, at the very least, there was no intent to discriminate. Yet,
as the administrative interpretations state 418 and as the courts have
consistently held, "no agreement between a company and a union,
even if arrived at as a result of collective bargaining negotiations
can be used as a defense by [an employer] to the statutory
requirements."419
Another such alleged "factor other than sex" arises from the
common hiring practice of paying an individual on the basis of the
lowest wage he or she will accept. Oftentimes, the result of this
approach is lower female wages, which the employer then asserts to
be based purely on marketplace considerations and not the product
of intended sex discrimination, Again, however, when faced with
this contention the Fifth Circuit has consistently held: "Clearly the
fact that the employer's bargaining power is greater with respect to
women than with respect to men is not the kind of factor which
Congress had in mind." 420 Indeed, as the Supreme Court noted in
Corning: 42'
The differential arose simply because men would not work
419 Hodgson v. Lenkurt Elec, Co., 20 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 1044, 1046, 70 CCH
Lab. Cas. 11 32,816 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
4 " Hodgson v. Corning Glass Works, 330 F. Supp. 46, 50 (W.D. N.Y. 1971), aff'd as
modified, with specific approval of the point, 474 F.2d 226, 235 (2d Cir.1973), aff'd sub
nom., Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 94 S. Ct. 2223 (1974).
419 29 C.F.R. § 800,106 (1973).
419 Hodgson v. Sagner, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 371, 375 (D. Md. 1971), aff'd sub nom.,
Hodgson v. Baltimore Regional Joint Bd., Amal. Clothing Workers, 462 F.2d 180 (4th Cir.
1972) (per curiam); quoted in Brennan v. Board of Educ., 374 F. Supp. 817, 832, 33, 131
n.31 (D. N.J. 1974). See also Wirtz v, Midwest Mfg. Corp., 18 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 556,
561, 58 CCH Lab, Cas. ¶ 32,070 (S.D. B1. 1968), where the invalidity of such a defense
resulted in the employer paying $238,695 in back wages, including interest, See Memorandum
of Morag Simchak, Chief, Branch of Equal Pay Discrimination, Employment Standards
Administration, U.S. Dep't of Labor (Jan. 1974).
42 ° Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen, Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 1970), See also
Brennan v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896, 902 (5th Cir. 1974); Brennan v, City
Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235, 241 n.12 (5th Cir. 1973).
421 Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 94 S. Ct. 2223 (1974).
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at the low rates paid women inspectors, and it reflected a
job market in which Corning could pay women less than
men for the same work. That the company took advantage
of such a situation may be understandable as a matter of
economics, but its differential nevertheless became illegal
once Congress enacted into law the principle of equal pay
for equal work. 422
XIV. CONCLUSION
A milestone in the progress of women toward full economic
opportunity was reached on June 11, 1964 when the EPA became
generally effective. The beneficial results of guaranteeing equal pay
through legislation are far reaching. Individuals will increasingly
receive wages directly proportionate to job-content requirements,
rather than in accordance with their sex and with sex-based
stereotypes. Women, whether married or single, will benefit from
their increased purchasing power and from the consequent rise in
standards of living. These benefits will also accrue to the families of
married, working women. Male workers will benefit through in-
creased job security, since employers will no longer seek to replace
them with lower-paid women. Today, millions of women in the
labor force perform capably in every field of endeavor; and, as their
numbers have increased, so has the importance of their work to the
national welfare.
The legislative history of the EPA demonstrates that members
of Congress had great hesitancy in enacting legislation which would
develop the economic rights of women. Many equal pay bills were
introduced prior to 1963. On each occasion members of Congress
would display their concern over the rights of women, and then,
promptly reject the many equal pay proposals.
Despite the passage of the EPA after years of effort, the courts
too were reluctant initially to construe its provisions in a broad,
liberal and humanitarian manner. In case after case, the courts
carefully scrutinized each phase, each minute portion of the mens'
work and then juxtaposed it with the work done by the women.
They would ultimately conclude that some secondary or tertiary
duty performed by one sex and not by the other constituted a
significant difference in the content of the work, and therefore the
unequal pay could be justified. It was not until 1970, with the
Wheaton Glass 423 decision, that the EPA began to assume vitality.
It can be said even today, however, that the EPA has not served as
422
 Id. at 4832.
423 Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905
(1970).
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a panacea to the American woman. Its reach is finite; its limitations
patent. Astute, resourceful, and ingenious counsel can and do make
a word of art out of each statutory term; "skill," "effort," "responsi-
bility," "working conditions," etc. Further, the issue of statutory
coverage and the existence of exceptions to the equal pay standard
are readily available and are fully utilized.
It is to be expected that the Corning424
 decision will bring the
EPA to its full fruition and give new impetus to enforcement ac-
tivities. Already, the magnitude of the settlement in the American
Telephone 425
 and related subsidiary cases 426 should make all aware
of the impact which the EPA has on the wages of women. These
cases emphasize the fact that large amounts of money are involved
when inequality of pay is found to be sex based.
In the immediate future, Congress should fully reexamine exist-
ing weaknesses in the EPA. Coverage should be expanded to in-
clude all American workers, not merely a portion thereof. The
meaning of the general exception, "any other factor other than sex,"
should be clarified and given some definite limits. It would, for
instance, be most welcome if Congress would specifically recognize
that this exception does not include any factor, but only those
factors which are related to individual job performance.
The battle to eliminate sex discrimination and to obtain equal-
ity of pay for women is in many ways analogous to the effort to
remove racial discrimination from the American scene. Such ef-
forts take years—too many years for those who suffer as a result.
There is great reluctance to accept the changes that the EPA seeks
to accomplish. Employers have found that the changes are costly;
and their immediate reaction is to resist any change which would
increase operating costs. Each employer is imbued with a sense of
rectitude and certitude. Each feels that no act of discrimination has
been committed. Each is able to rationalize the particular method of
payment without any undue difficulty.
Slowly but surely, however, as was true of the minimum wage
and overtime compensation provisions of the FLSA as first enacted
in 1938, employers will develop a clear respect of the EPA's provi-
sions and requirements. No longer will they wait for employee
complaints to be made and for federal compliance officers to submit
summaries of unpaid wages. For whatever their individual reasons,
they will add up their balance sheets and realize that self-analysis
and self-policing will in the long run prove to be the best policy.
424 Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 94 S. Ct. 2223 (1974).
425 See EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 365 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
426
 See, e.g., Hodgson v. Pacific Tel. & Tel2Co., 20 BNA Wage & Hour Cas. 411, 68
CCH Lab. Cas. 1i 32,659 (N.D, Cal. 1971).
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